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Abstract
This paper discusses the relationship between education and crime from an economic perspective, developing a human capital-based model that sheds light on key ways in which early childhood
programs and policies that encourage schooling may affect both juvenile and adult crime. The paper first discusses evidence on the effects of educational attainment, school quality, and school
enrollment on crime. Next, the paper discusses evidence on the crime reduction effects of preschool
programs like Perry Preschool and Head Start, school-age programs that emphasize social and
emotional development, and job training programs for low-skill adolescents and young adults. Finally, the paper concludes with a broad discussion of education policy and its potential role as a
crime-fighting strategy.
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Introduction

In 1997, over two-thirds of all prison inmates in the U.S. were high school dropouts (Harlow 2003).
Although education policy has not been a major factor driving trends in crime over the past 25
years—high school completion rates have remained relatively stable since the 1980s, while crime has
both risen and fallen dramatically during that time—it is natural to ask what role education policy
does and should play in affecting crime rates in the U.S. Put another way, have we struck the right
balance between police, prisons and schools? All three appear to reduce crime, but education and
training have many benefits that prisons and police do not. In fact, Donohue and Siegelman (1998)
argue that well-targeted preschool-type programs might be more cost-effective criminal deterrents than
raising incarceration rates. Lochner and Moretti (2004) make a strong case for increasing high school
graduation rates as an alternative to increasing the size of police forces. Yet, accounting for inflation,
government expenditures on education only increased by a factor of 1.2 between 1980 and 2005, while
expenditures on police and law enforcement rose by a factor of 1.5 and expenditures on corrections
more than tripled (with the largest increase coming in the 1980s).1
∗
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1
Using the Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers (CPI-U) to adjust for inflation, expenditures on primary,
secondary, vocational, and higher education were $332.8 billion in 1980, while expenditures on police and corrections
were $37.3 and $15.5 billion, respectively (Tables 417, 455, 490, 499, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1995).
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Despite promising evidence that education-based policies and early childhood interventions can
play an important role in helping reduce crime, evidence is still limited and sometimes mixed. The
link between schooling and crime is more complicated than simple prison statistics suggest. This
chapter reviews evidence in this rapidly growing area and develops a human capital-based theory for
interpreting much of this evidence.
We first discuss the relationship between education and crime from an economic perspective, developing a simple model that sheds light on key ways in which early childhood programs and policies that
encourage schooling may affect both juvenile and adult crime. The model developed in Section 2 is
grounded in human capital theory and paints with a broad brush. It emphasizes the choice individuals
face between legitimate work and criminal activity, with its associated punishments. By altering the
relative rewards of work and crime, educational investments affect decisions to engage in crime. While
the model does not incorporate all avenues through which education may affect crime, it serves as a
useful point of reference.
In Section 3, we discuss evidence on the impacts of educational attainment and school quality/choice on adult crime. The evidence from studies of educational attainment on crime is largely
consistent with a human capital-based theory of crime, suggesting that increases in schooling reduce
most types of adult crime (e.g. Lochner 2004, Lochner and Moretti 2004). Studies of school choice
and increases in school quality paint a more nuanced picture: sizeable improvements in school quality
produce minor (at best) improvements in student achievement and educational attainment, while they
appear to substantially reduce crime during late adolescence and early adulthood (Cullen, Jacob, and
Levitt 2006, Deming 2009a). It is unclear whether ‘better’ schools largely improve social development
or the peers and social networks of disadvantaged youth. We next discuss the contemporaneous relationship between school attendance and crime. Using exogenous policy changes and other events that
effectively force students to stay in school or take extra days off (e.g. changes in compulsory schooling
laws, teacher in-service days and strikes), a few recent studies have shown that school attendance
affects crime in rich and complex ways. Forcing some students to stay in school an extra year or
two reduces both violent and property crime substantially (Anderson 2009), consistent with the time
allocation human capital model developed in Section 2. Yet, day-to-day changes in school attendance
have opposing effects on violent and property crime. An extra day of school appears to reduce property
crime while increasing violent crime (Jacob and Lefgren 2003, Luallen 2006). The latter most likely
reflects social interaction effects from bringing together hundreds of adolescents and letting them all
loose at the same time.
Note that total expenditures for corrections in 1980 do not include any municipal-level expenditures. Expenditures on
education, police, and corrections were $725.2, $94.6, and $65.1 billion in 2005 (Tables 481 and 522, Statistical Abstract
of the United States, 2009)

2

Section 4 reviews a number of recent studies that examine the long-run impacts of early childhood, school-based, and young adult training interventions on juvenile and adult crime. While a few
early preschool programs have produced sizeable long-run reductions in crime – most famously, Perry
Preschool – other quite similar programs have not. School-based programs focused on improving social development among ‘risky’ children have been shown to reduce crime through early adulthood.
Finally, job training for young adults (e.g. Job Corps) appears to reduce self-reported arrests and
convictions during the period of intensive training, but it yields negligible lasting effects on crime.
Altogether, the evidence suggests that reductions in crime can be achieved by a wide range of human
capital-based intervention strategies.
We discuss a number of policy issues related to education and its potential role as a crime-fighting
strategy in Section 5 and offer concluding thoughts in Section 6.

2

The Economics of Education and Crime

Why might education reduce crime, and should its effects vary across different types of crimes? How
might education and human capital policies help reduce crime? To answer these questions, we develop
a simple economic model that formalizes a number of key channels through which education may affect
crime. We then provide a brief discussion of other factors that may help determine the relationship
between education and crime.

2.1

A Two-Period Model of School, Work, and Crime

To better understand the effects of early childhood programs and education policy on criminal behavior, we consider a simple two-period model of human capital investment, work, and crime. The model
developed here abstracts from many things to focus attention on the effects of education and human
capital-based policies on crime.2 It emphasizes the role of education as a human capital investment
that increases future legitimate work opportunities, which discourages participation in crime. This is
consistent with numerous recent studies that show that higher wages reduce crime (e.g. Grogger 1998,
Machin and Meghir 2004, Gould, et al. 2002) and decades of research in labor economics showing that
education increases wage rates (see, e.g., Card 1999).
The two key assumptions of this human capital-based approach are (i) individual rationality and (ii)
the fact that crime requires time: in terms of planning, simply ‘hanging around’ waiting for something
to happen, carrying out the activity, avoiding arrest, or incarceration. Regarding the second, a number
of studies discuss the implicit ‘wage rates’ for time spent engaging in property crimes like drug dealing
2

For a more detailed treatment of the lifecycle human capital investment problem and the age-crime profile, see
Lochner (2004).
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or burglary.3 Yet, for many other offenses, especially violent offenses, the criminal act itself may
require little time; however, expected time in police stations, courtrooms, and prison cells may be
substantial. The total time associated with most criminal acts may, in fact, be dominated by expected
incarceration time. Taking this into account, the expected time associated with many volent offenses
is likely to exceed that for most property crimes as seen in Table 1 (from Lochner 2004), which reports
probabilities of arrest, probabilities of conviction conditional on arrest, probabilities of incarceration
conditional on conviction, estimated time served if incarcerated, and overall expected time served per
crime committed for common violent and property crimes.
Now, consider the choices faced by adolescents and adults. In the first period (adolescence),
individuals are assumed to allocate their time to crime (c1 ≥ 0), work (L1 ≥ 0), and human capital
investment (I ≥ 0) subject to the time constraint c1 + L1 + I = 1. In the second period (adulthood),
individuals decide only between crime (c2 ≥ 0) and work (L2 ≥ 0) subject to c2 + L2 = 1. In
considering time spent committing crime, it is useful to think generally about the total expected time
spent planning and committing crimes, avoiding arrest, ‘hanging around’ waiting for an opportunity
to arise, and in court or jail/prison.
While we do not explicitly model childhood, we assume that individuals enter adolescence with a
set of endowments that affect subsequent behavior. These endowments may be shaped by early family
and public investments. As a result, they may be manipulated by early childhood interventions as well
as school-based policies (e.g. elementary school quality, preschool programs). We explicitly consider
three types of adolescent ‘endowments’ developed throughout childhood: ‘learning productivity’ A,
initial human capital levels H1 , and ‘criminal propensity’ θ. It is useful to think of these three
‘endowments’ quite generally, as parameters which embody individual characteristics as well as the
environment faced by individuals. For example, A reflects anything that increases the productivity
of adolescent human capital investments (either through formal schooling or more informal on-thejob training). This may include raw IQ, peers, or local middle or high school quality. Similarly, θ
represents any factors that may affect the net expected returns to crime for an individual (e.g. criminal
skill, preferences for risk, or a personal aversion to crime or prison).
Human capital investments through schooling and training improve adult skills H2 :
H2 = H1 + h(I, H1 ; A),

(1)

where h(·) is increasing in each of its arguments (i.e. hj > 0 for j = I, H1 , A) and there are diminishing
marginal returns to investment (i.e. hII < 0). These conditions ensure that education and training
increase human capital at a diminishing rate. We further assume that students with higher levels
3

See Freeman (1999) for a survey of this literature.
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of human capital, H1 , and learning productivity, A, produce more human capital for any amount of
investment (hIA , hIH > 0). Both ability and initial skill levels are, therefore, complementary with skill
investment.
For each unit of time spent working, Lt , an individual earns Ht . Thus, Ht reflects an individual’s
potential earnings if he devotes all his time to work. Investment, I, has no immediate payoff; however,
it may be subsidized by the government at rate s. These subsidies more generally represent any
incentives the government may provide for schooling or training.
Assume that time spent committing crime each period, ct , yields a net return of N (ct , Ht ; θ), where
for simplicity we abstract from uncertainty about punishment.4 As noted earlier, the parameter θ
represents any factors that may affect the net returns to crime for an individual. As such, θ is
a function of early childhood investments, family background, and neighborhoods, as well as law
enforcement and incarceration policies. In general, the net expected returns to crime, as well as the
marginal returns to crime Nc , may be positive or negative. However, we assume that Ncθ > 0, so
persons with a high θ have a greater total and marginal expected return from crime.
For criminals, the net marginal return to crime (Nc ) must be positive, but this need not be the
case for non-criminals. Many individuals commit crime while working or attending school. This
suggests that Ncc < 0 whenever Nc > 0 (i.e. if net returns to crime increase with the amount of time
spent committing crime, they do so at a diminishing rate).5 We, therefore, make this assumption
throughout.
On the one hand, individuals with more human capital are likely to be better criminals as well
as better workers. (White collar crimes like fraud and embezzlement are perfect examples.) On the
other hand, more highly skilled workers experience greater losses in earnings while imprisoned, and
they may also have a greater aversion to crime (as emphasized by Usher (1993)). The analysis below
assumes that the positive effects of human capital on criminal returns weakly outweigh the negative
effects on expected costs associated with punishment, so NH ≥ 0, NcH ≥ 0 and NHH ≤ 0. Of course,
human capital is likely to have negligible effects on the returns to many property crimes (i.e. NH = 0,
a case not ruled out in our analysis).
2.1.1

The Individual’s Decision

Taking (A, H1 , θ) and s as given, individuals choose investment and time spent in work and crime to
maximize the present value of lifetime earnings. Assuming a gross interest rate R ≥ 1, and substituting
4

We implicitly assume that any expected punishments are incurred during the period the crime is committed. This
is consistent with the fact that most juveniles caught committing crime face relatively short periods of incarceration.
Dealing more explicitly with uncertainty and lags in punishment would not change the nature of most results discussed
here. See Lochner (2004, 2010) for a lifecycle model that explicitly incorporates these features.
5
If net marginal returns were positive and increasing, individuals would specialize.
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in the time constraints, individuals
max {H1 (1 − I − c1 ) + sI1 + N (c1 , H1 ; θ)} + R−1 {H2 (1 − c2 ) + N (c2 , H2 ; θ)} ,

I,c1 ,c2

(2)

subject to the human accumulation equation (1) and the time constraints I ≥ 0, c1 ≥ 0, c2 ≥ 0, and
I + c1 ≤ 1.
While the individual decision problem is framed as an income maximization problem and directly
applies to crimes with a financial motive, the framework can also be used to study violent crime.
In the case of violent crime, the function N (·) reflects the monetary equivalent of any ‘psychic’ or
non-pecuniary benefits from violent crime.
We assume that s < H1 , so that investment subsidies are not large enough to make investment
more lucrative than work unless there is some future return on investment. The problem yields the
following interior first order conditions for I, c1 , and c2 :
H1 − s = R−1 [(1 − c2 ) + NH (c2 , H2 ; θ)] hI (I, H1 ; A)

(3)

H1 = Nc (c1 , H1 ; θ)

(4)

H2 = Nc (c2 , H2 ; θ).

(5)

These conditions hold for individuals who allocate some time to each activity during adolescence and
adulthood and are useful for studying investment, work, and crime at the intensive margin.6 Individuals equate the marginal returns on investment and crime each period to their potential legitimate
wage rate Ht (less any investment subsidies in the case of investment).7 Because it is fixed at any
point in time, this wage rate reflects the opportunity cost for individuals in choosing how much time
to spend investing in new skills or on the commission of crime. Among adolescents who spend some
time working, small increases in investment (e.g. due to an increase in its return) will come at the
expense of adolescent work and not juvenile crime; juvenile crime will also trade off with work (at
the margin) and not investment. This suggests that we might not expect significant ‘incapacitation’
effects of school among students who also participate heavily in the labor market.
Equation (3) shows that schooling provides returns in the form of higher future earnings from
work and potentially from crime through increased human capital. If education does not raise the
returns from crime, youth that plan to spend more time committing crime as an adult will benefit
less from school and should, therefore, choose to invest less in their human capital. Thus, a negative
6

The second order conditions are not particularly informative. They do require that Ncc < 0, as assumed. While the
second order conditions do not necessarily hold everywhere for all possible parameterizations, we assume that they hold
at any given interior solution for the (local) comparative static results derived below.
7
Equations (4) and (5) and diminishing marginal returns to crime (Ncc < 0) are consistent with higher average ‘wage
rates’ for many property crimes (relative to typical legitimate opportunities) as discussed in Freeman (1999).
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relationship between schooling and adult crime may result from individual heterogeneity in tastes for
crime or from local differences in criminal opportunities, law enforcement, and punishment regimes.
The effect of educational attainment on adult crime is embodied in equation (5). Anything that
increases investment in human capital raises H2 , which raises the returns from legitimate work and
the opportunity cost of engaging in crime. Of course, human capital may also raise the return to
crime, so the net effect of schooling on adult crime depends on the balance of these two effects. In
general, we would expect education to provide greater returns in the labor market than for most types
of crime, so education should reduce adult crime. Notice that individuals with a higher learning ability
A will benefit more from school, so we might expect greater reductions in adult crime among smarter
youth in response to school-based policies. Of course, there is little scope for school-based policies to
reduce crime among those who would normally eschew crime as adults in the first place. As such,
education-based initiatives aimed at adolescents are likely to achieve greater reductions in crime if
they target relatively intelligent (high A) youth with low initial skill levels (H1 ) and high returns to
crime (i.e. high θ).
For youth with high enough returns to crime or investment such that they choose not to work
at all during adolescence (i.e. I ∗ + c∗1 = 1), conditions (3) and (4) reduce to a single first order
condition equating the marginal returns on adolescent crime with the marginal returns on investment:
Nc (1 − I, H1 ; θ) − s = R−1 [(1 − c2 ) + NH (c2 , H2 ; θ)] hI (I, H1 ; A). Among these individuals, time spent
investing and adolescent crime trade off one-for-one, so education-based policies may have sizeable
impacts on crime among non-working juvenile criminals.
2.1.2

Education and Early Childhood Policies

We consider the implications of policies which may alter incentives to invest in human capital (i.e.
changes in s), as well as earlier childhood or school-age policies that impact adolescent ‘endowments’
(A, H1 , θ).8 Our results apply to individuals who spend some time in both school and on crime during
adolescence and who spend some time committing crime and working during adulthood. In some
cases, the effects of policies differ (as noted) between individuals who also spend some time working
during adolescence and those who do not.
The following condition is useful for a number of results.
Condition 1. NcH ≤ 1.
This condition implies that human capital does not raise the returns to crime more than it raises
8
Policies to improve high schools may also directly affect the productivity of time spent in school, A, and socialization,
θ. In this sense, these parameters may be directly manipulated by policy; however, we assume that they are not freely
chosen by adolescents. Of course, families may shape these parameters through earlier investments as discussed above.
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the returns to legitimate work. It may not hold in the case of certain types of white collar crimes, but
it is likely to hold for most common ‘street’ crimes like larceny, assault, or robbery.
We first discuss the effects of education subsidies, or policies that generally encourage schooling.9
Result 1. A marginal increase in education subsidies, s: (i) increases investment in human capital;
(ii) does not affect crime for working adolescents but reduces crime among non-working adolescents;
and (iii) reduces adult crime if Condition 1 holds and increases adult crime otherwise.
Education subsidies do not affect criminal behavior for adolescents who work, because the amount
of time spent committing crime is determined only by their potential wage rate. Time spent investing
trades off one-for-one with time spent working.10 Non-working adolescents increase their investment
and reduce their criminal activity in response to higher investment subsidies. For them, criminal
activity necessarily trades off with investment. As long as the returns to human capital are higher in
the legitimate sector than the criminal sector, education subsidies will reduce adult crime rates.
It is worth noting, however, that crimes with a higher return to skill than legitimate work will tend
to increase (among adults) in response to education subsidies. Thus, it is possible that some forms of
white collar crime may increase following policies that promote skill investments.
Since parental inputs, family background, early childhood programs, and school quality operate on
the ‘endowment’ parameters (A, H1 , θ), understanding how these parameters affect individual decisions
is important. We begin by studying the effects of changes in learning productivity, A.
Result 2. A marginal increase in learning productivity, A: (i) increases investment in human capital
if NHH is sufficiently close to zero; (ii) does not affect crime for working adolescents but reduces crime
among non-working adolescents (if NHH ≈ 0); and (iii) reduces adult crime if Condition 1 holds and
increases adult crime otherwise.
Policies that increase learning productivity or cognitive ability have qualitatively similar effects
to an increase in education subsidies. Not surprisingly, an increase in the productivity of schooling
(or learning ability) causes individuals to invest more in their skills. Adolescent criminal activity is
unaffected by small changes in A for working adolescents. Since initial potential wage rates are fixed,
9

All results are derived formally in the Appendix.
The fact that wage rates are unaffected by hours worked but criminal earnings are declining in time spent committing
crime is key to this result. If wage rates depend on the number of hours worked, time spent committing crime during
adolescence will be affected by an investment subsidy even for those who are working. Additionally, if incarceration
extends for many years into the future, an investment subsidy may reduce adolescent crime among workers, since the
expected costs from future incarceration are increasing in investment (Lochner 2004, 2010). Finally, large enough
education subsidies could cause youth to stop working altogether, in which case they would also reduce their criminal
activity.
10
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individuals simply substitute work for investment.11 More investment means higher levels of human
capital and higher wage rates during adulthood. As long as the criminal returns to human capital
are not too high, this lowers adult crime and increases time spent working. Non-working adolescents
commit less crime in response to an increase in A, since higher investment must trade off with time
spent committing crime.
Policies that raise initial skill levels (H1 ) can yield different implications, especially for adolescents.
Result 3. Among working adolescents, an increase initial skill levels, H1 , reduces adolescent crime
if Condition 1 holds; otherwise, it increases adolescent crime. Among non-working adolescents, if
human capital does not affect the net returns to crime (i.e. NH = 0), then an increase in H1 increases
investment and reduces both adolescent and adult crime.
As long as human capital is rewarded more in the labor market than the criminal sector, an increase
in the skills of working youth reduces juvenile crime. However, it has ambiguous effects on investment,
because it raises both the opportunity cost of and return to education. This means that it is not
possible to generally sign the effects of changes in H1 on adult human capital and crime for working
youth; however, we would typically expect adult crime to be decreasing in H1 . Among non-working
adolescents, increases in skill have no effect on the opportunity cost of investment. As such, an increase
in H1 unambiguously raises their investment and reduces their participation in crime at all ages (if
human capital does not affect criminal returns).
Finally, we discuss the effects of policies that alter the expected returns to crime. These policies
may have their effects through socialization or simply through increasing the probability of arrest or
incarceration.
Result 4. A reduction in criminal returns, θ, reduces adolescent crime for working adolescents. If
Condition 1 holds and NHθ ≤ 0, then a reduction in θ also: (i) increases schooling investments; (ii)
reduces adolescent crime for non-working adolescents; and (iii) reduces adult crime.
A lower criminal return directly encourages individuals to work more at all ages. By shifting time
from crime to work during adulthood, a reduction in criminal returns raises the return to investment
(assuming criminal returns to skill are low). Increased schooling investment increases adult wage
rates, which causes individuals to further re-allocate time from crime to work as adults. Thus, the
endogeneity of schooling and work leads to larger reductions in adult crime than would be predicted
if either were held fixed.
11

As with education subsidies, large increases in A may cause youth to stop working altogether and substitute away
from crime as well. It is also likely that individuals with a higher learning ability also possess a higher initial skill level
H1 by the time they reach adolescence, in which case criminal activity during adolescence would be lower for those with
high A and H1 . The effects of H1 on crime are discussed further below.
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These results, particularly the last, highlight why cross-sectional comparisons of education and
crime are difficult to interpret. On the one hand, youth who invest more through school should
commit less crime as adults. On the other hand, youth planning to spend much of their adult lives
on crime (and in jail) receive little return from school and will choose to invest little in school. Thus,
a negative education – crime relationship can arise, because education reduces crime or because a life
of crime renders education useless.

2.2

Other Ways in Which Education May Affect Crime

Education may also teach individuals to be more patient (Becker and Mulligan 1997). This would
discourage crime, since forward-looking individuals place greater weight on any expected future punishment associated with their criminal activities. To the extent that time preferences are affected by
schooling, crimes associated with long prison sentences (or other long-term consequences) should be
most affected. Education may also affect preferences toward risk. If schooling makes individuals more
risk averse, it should discourage crime with its greatest effects on offenses that entail considerable uncertainty in returns or punishment. Finally, schooling may affect the set of people individuals interact
with on a daily basis in school, work, or their neighborhoods. Assuming more educated people interact
more with other educated people who are less inclined to engage in crime, this is likely to compound
any reductions in crime associated with schooling.12 In most cases, mechanisms related to changes in
preferences or social interactions suggest that educational attainment is likely to reduce most types of
crime among adults.

2.3

School Attendance and Contemporaneous Crime

It is useful to distinguish between the effects of educational attainment on subsequent criminal activity,
and the way in which school attendance itself affects contemporaneous crime. The latter relationship
is likely to be driven by three mechanisms. First, school may have an incapacitation effect – youth
cannot be in two places at once and many criminal opportunities are more limited in school than on
the streets. Of course, school does not last all day, so this effect depends, in part, on the ease with
which youth can engage in crime during non-school hours. This mechanism is inherent in the time
allocation problem above. Second, longer periods of school attendance should increase human capital
levels and improve future employment prospects. This, in turn, may make juvenile arrests and long
periods of detention more costly, reducing incentives to engage in crime while enrolled in school.13
12

See Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996) for a model of crime where social interactions are important.
The model above abstracts from this by implicitly assuming that punishments occur in the same period that crimes
are committed and that there are no long-term effects of punishment on human capital or employment opportunities;
however, it is straightforward to incorporate these effects in a lifecycle model with multi-period punishments as in Lochner
(2004, 2010).
13
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Third, schools bring hundreds of adolescents together for the day and then let them all loose at the
same time. The social interaction effects from doing this are far from obvious, but it is quite possible
that this leads to altercations and more general group-based delinquency. The incapacitation and
human capital effects are likely to to imply negative effects of school attendance on crime, while the
social interaction effect could be positive or negative.

3

Evidence on Education and Crime

We now discuss evidence on the effects of educational attainment and school quality and choice on
subsequent criminal outcomes. We also review empirical studies that analyze the relationship between
school attendance and contemporaneous crime.

3.1

Educational Attainment and Crime

We have discussed four primary reasons schooling might affect subsequent crime: (i) education raises
wage rates, which raises the opportunity costs of crime; (ii) education may directly affect the financial
or ‘psychic’ rewards from crime; (iii) education may alter preferences for risk-taking or patience; and
(iv) schooling may affect the social networks or peers of individuals. For most crimes (except, possibly,
white collar crimes), one would expect these forces to induce a negative effect of schooling on adult
crime.
Empirically, there is a strong negative correlation between educational attainment and various
measures of crime. In 1997, 75% of state and 59% of federal prison inmates in the U.S. did not have a
high school diploma (Harlow 2003).14 After controlling for age, state of birth, state of residence, year
of birth and year effects, Lochner and Moretti (2004) still find significant effects of schooling (especially
high school completion) on the probability of incarceration in the U.S. as reported in Figure 1.15 In
2001, more than 75% of convicted persons in Italy had not completed high school (Buonanno and
Leonida 2009), while incarceration rates among men ages 21-25 in the United Kingdom were more
than 8 times higher for those without an education qualification (i.e. dropouts) relative to those with
a qualification (Machin, Marie, and Vujic 2010).
Differences by education are also apparent in self-reported survey measures of crime. For example,
in the 1980 wave of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), 34% of American men ages 2014
These figures exclude those who received a General Educational Development (GED) diploma. As shown in Cameron
and Heckman (2003) and Heckman and LaFontaine (2006), individuals with a GED perform like high school dropouts
rather than graduates in the labor market. Roughly 35% of state inmates and 33% of federal inmates completed their
GED with more than two-thirds of these inmates earning their GED while incarcerated. A small percentage of those
who did not receive a high school diploma had participated in some vocational or post-secondary courses. See Harlow
(2003).
15
These figures report the coefficients on indicators for different years of completed schooling from the 1960, 1970, and
1980 Censuses for white and black men ages 20-60.
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23 with 11 or 12 years of completed schooling self-reported earning some income from crime, compared
with 24% of those with 12 years of school, and only 17% of those with more than 12 years. The effect of
education is magnified if we consider more active criminal engagement: 4.2% of 20-23 year-old NLSY
men completing 10 or 11 years of school reported earning more than half their income from crime,
compared with 1.4% of those with 12 years and 0.7% of those with at least some college education.
Similar patterns are observed for violent crime in the NLSY. See Lochner (2004) for further details.
Early studies of the relationship between education and crime focused on their correlation conditional on measured individual and family characteristics using standard regression methods.16 For
example, Witte and Tauchen (1994) find no significant relationship between educational attainment
and crime after controlling for a number of individual characteristics. Grogger (1998) estimates a
significant negative effect of wages on crime, but he finds no relationship between years of completed
schooling and crime after controlling for individual wage rates. Of course, increased wages and earnings are important consequences of schooling. Thus, this study suggests that education may indirectly
reduce crime through increased wage rates.
These earlier studies must be interpreted with caution. A negative cross-sectional correlation between education and crime, even after controlling for measured family background and neighborhood
characteristics, does not necessarily imply that education reduces crime. Standard regression studies
are unlikely to estimate the causal effect of eduction on crime (i.e. the effect of increasing someone’s
schooling on his criminal activity) for a number of reasons. First, unobserved individual characteristics like patience or risk aversion are likely to directly affect both schooling and criminal decisions.
Individuals who choose more schooling (even after conditioning on observable characteristics) might
also choose less crime regardless of their education level, in which case regression-based estimates do
not identify a causal effect. Second, using variation in crime and education across states or local
communities may also produce biased estimates. Governments may face a choice between funding
police or good public schools, which would tend to produce a spurious positive correlation between
education and crime. Alternatively, unobserved characteristics about communities or their residents
may directly affect the costs or benefits of both education and crime. For example, communities with
few job opportunities that reward schooling may also be faced with severe gang problems. While it is
often possible to account for permanent unobserved differences across communities by examining the
relationship between changes in schooling and crime over time, this approach does not account for the
effects of changing unobserved community characteristics. Third, reverse causality is another important concern, for reasons discussed in Section 2. Individuals who plan to heavily engage in crime (e.g.
because they are particularly good at it, enjoy it, or live in areas with plenty of illicit opportunities)
16

Ehrlich (1975) provides an early empirical exploration of predicted effects of education on crime from a human capital
perspective. See Witte (1997) for a survey of the early empirical literature on education and crime.
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are likely to choose to leave school at a young age. Arrests or incarceration associated with juvenile
crime may also cause some youth to drop out of school early (Hjalmarsson 2008).
Recently, economists have attempted to address these difficult issues and to estimate the causal
effects of schooling on crime using instrumental variable (IV) methods. In the context of estimating
the effect of educational attainment on crime, an instrument is valid if it induces variation in schooling
but is uncorrelated with other factors that directly affect criminal proclivity (e.g. individual preferences or abilities, local law enforcement). Intuitively, this approach exploits differences in educational
attainment across individuals that arise in response to factors that have no direct impact on criminal
decisions. An ideal instrument would randomly assign some youth to drop out of high school and
others to finish. Then, comparing the differences in crime rates across these groups would identify the
causal effect of high school completion on crime. In practice, we typically do not observe such perfect
experiments, but researchers can sometimes come close.
Because crime itself is difficult to measure, researchers are often forced to use measures of arrest or
incarceration rather than actual crimes committed. It is possible that education reduces the probability
of arrest and incarceration or the sentence lengths administered by judges, in which case estimates
based on measures of arrest or incarceration incorporate these effects in addition to any effects of
education on actual crime. While there is little direct evidence on these issues, Mustard (2001) finds
negligible effects of defendant education levels on the sentence lengths they receive. Furthermore,
results using self-reported measures of crime in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY)
support the case that education reduces actual violent and property crime and not just the probability
of arrest or incarceration conditional on crime (Lochner 2004, Lochner and Moretti 2004).17
Many recent empirical studies analyze crime aggregated at some geographic level, exploring the
effects of average educational attainment on crime, arrest, conviction, or incarceration rates. In order
to address concerns with endogeneity or unobserved heterogeneity, researchers have typically turned
to instrumental variables estimation or a differences-in-differences strategy using changes in state or
national rules that affect schooling decisions. An aggregate-level regression is often specified as follows:
ycalt = βEalt + γXalt + dlt + dcl + dal + dct + dat + dca + εcalt

(6)

where ycalt is a measure of the crime, arrest, or incarceration rate for some offense type c, age group
a, in location l, in year t. In some cases, only a single measure of crime is used (e.g. incarceration or
17

There has been considerable debate among criminologists on the merits of self-reported measures of crime vs. official
measures of arrest. Most studies find a reasonably high correlation between the two; however, it is generally agreed that
the two measures offer distinct and complementary information about criminal activity. Comparisons of self-reported
arrests vs. official arrests tend to find a stronger correlation, with agreement increasing further for self-reported vs.
official measures of criminal convictions. A number of studies report greater under-reporting of crimes and arrests by
blacks; however, studies vary considerably on this. See the classic Hindelang, Hirschi, and Weis (1981) for comprehensive
treatment of the issue or Thornberry and Krohn (2000) for a more recent survey of this literature.
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total arrests), in which case the c subscript is extraneous. Ealt is an aggregate measure of educational
attainment for age group a in location l at time t (e.g. average schooling attainment or high school
completion rates). Xalt is a set of observable characteristics that may vary across age, location,
and time (e.g. racial composition of an area). The d’s represent indicator variables that account for
unobserved differences by age/cohort, location, year, and criminal offense types. The term dlt allows for
location-specific time effects, which accounts for time varying unobserved location-specific differences
that may reflect differences in local public spending, economic conditions, or law enforcement. The
inclusion of dcl allows the average distribution of crime or arrest types to differ across areas. For
example, some states may focus arrests more heavily on one type of crime, while others focus on
other types. Or, some areas may be more amenable to certain crimes while others are not. Similarly,
the age distribution of crime or arrests need not be the same across areas – some age groups may
be more crime-prone in some areas or arrest policies with respect to age may differ across areas.
The term dal absorbs long-run differences in age-arrest patterns across locations. Crime-specific and
age-specific time trends in arrest common to all areas are accounted for by dct and dat , respectively.
Finally, dca accounts for long-term differences in age-crime profiles across different types of criminal
offenses. Given these fixed effects, identification of the effect of education on crime is achieved through
time variation in cohort educational attainment levels across different locations. The absence of dalt
indicator variables in equation (6) is, therefore, central to identification.
Lochner and Moretti (2004) examine state-level male arrest rates by criminal offense and age (fiveyear age categories beginning at ages 20-24 through 55-59) from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports
(UCR) for the U.S. in 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990. This data is linked to 1960-90 decennial U.S.
Census data on educational attainment and race to estimate equation (6), where ycalt represents log
arrest rates for a specific offense, age category, state, and Census year. They specifically analyze arrest
rates for murder, rape, assault, robbery, burglary, larceny, auto theft, and arson. In using log arrest
rates, the effect of education is assumed to be the same in percentage terms for each type of crime
included in the regression. They explore the effects of both average years of schooling and high school
completion rates at the cohort-level (cohorts are defined by year of birth given year t and age a) in
state l as of time t (i.e. Ealt ). In addition to including all the d fixed effects in equation (6), they also
include the percent of males that are black in age group a living in state l at time t (i.e. Xalt ).
The main methodological contribution of Lochner and Moretti (2004) is the use of changes in statespecific compulsory schooling laws over time as instrumental variables for schooling.18 Intuitively, this
strategy measures the extent to which an increase in a state’s compulsory schooling age leads to an
immediate increase in educational attainment and reduction in subsequent crime rates for affected
18

The relevant compulsory schooling age is based on the state law that applied when a cohort was age 14.
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cohorts. Lochner and Moretti’s (2004) analysis suggests that changes in compulsory schooling laws
are exogenous and not related to prior trends in schooling or state expenditures on law enforcement,
so it appears to be a valid instrument. Other studies reach similar conclusions about the exogenous
nature of changes in compulsory schooling laws in other contexts (e.g. Acemoglu and Angrist 2001,
Lleras-Muney 2002).
Lochner and Moretti (2004) estimate equation (6) using both ordinary least squares (OLS) and
instrumental variables (IV) estimation. Using OLS, they find that a one-year increase in average
education levels in a state reduces state-level arrest rates by 11 percent. IV estimates suggest slightly
larger effects, although they are not statistically different. These estimated effects are very similar
to the predicted effects derived from multiplying the estimated increase in wages associated with an
additional year of school by the estimated effects of higher wage rates on crime (from Gould, et al.
2002). This suggests that much of the effect of schooling on crime may come through increased wage
rates and opportunity costs as emphasized in the model of Section 2. Given the strong relationship
between high school completion and incarceration apparent in Figure 1, Lochner and Moretti (2004)
also estimate specifications using the high school completion rate as a measure of schooling. OLS
estimates suggest that a ten percentage point increase in high school graduation rates would reduce
arrest rates by 7%, while IV estimates suggest a slightly larger impact of 9%.
Lochner and Moretti (2004) also estimate separate effects of education for different types of crime
using OLS (including interactions of criminal offense type with education in equation (6)). These
results suggest similar effects across the broad categories of violent (murder, rape, robbery, and assault)
and property (burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson) crime — a one year increase in average
years of schooling reduces both property and violent crime by about 11-12%. However, the effects
vary considerably within these categories. A one-year increase in average years of schooling reduces
murder and assault by almost 30 percent, motor vehicle theft by 20 percent, arson by 13 percent, and
burglary and larceny by about 6 percent. Estimated effects on robbery are negligible, while those
for rape are significantly positive. Additional specifications suggest quantitatively similar effects for a
10-20 percentage point increase in high school graduation rates. Their results for rape are surprising
and not easily explained by standard economic models of crime.19
Lochner (2004) follows a very similar approach using the same UCR data from 1960 to 1980;
however, he also examines white collar crime. OLS estimation of equation (6) produces positive,
though statistically insignificant, effects of schooling on arrest rates for white collar crimes (forgery
and counterfeiting, fraud, and embezzlement). Estimates for violent and property crime are negative
and similar to those of Lochner and Moretti (2004).
19

However, the results are consistent with some specifications in Gould, et al. (2002), which suggests that local wage
rates are positively correlated with local crime rates for rape.
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Lochner and Moretti (2004) also use individual-level data on incarceration and schooling from
the 1960, 1970, and 1980 U.S. Censuses to estimate the effects of educational attainment on the
probability of imprisonment separately for black and white men (ages 20-60). Their estimates control
for age of the respondent (three-year age categories), state of birth, state of residence, cohort of birth,
and state-specific year effects. Most importantly, controlling for state-specific year effects allows for
the possibility that different states may have different time trends for law enforcement policies or
may simply exhibit different trends in aggregate criminal activity. Analogous to their analysis of
state-level arrest rates, they use state-level changes in compulsory schooling ages as an instrument for
educational attainment. Although this analysis uses individual-based measures of incarceration and
schooling, variation in schooling laws at the state-year level effectively identifies the effect of education
on crime. As with the estimates for aggregate arrest rates, identification comes from the fact that in
any given state and year, different age cohorts faced different compulsory schooling laws during their
high school years, causing them to acquire different levels of schooling and to commit crime at different
rates. Again, both OLS and IV estimates are very similar and suggest that, on average, an extra year
of education reduces the probability of imprisonment by slightly more than .1 percentage point for
whites and by about .4 percentage points for blacks. In their sample, the probability of incarceration
for male whites (blacks) without a high school degree averaged .83% (3.6%), which translates into a
10-15% reduction in incarceration rates for both white and black males associated with an extra year of
completed schooling. These estimated effects are comparable to those for arrest rates described earlier.
OLS results suggest that completion of the twelfth grade causes the greatest drop in incarceration,
while their is little effect of schooling beyond high school (see Figure 1).
Oreopolous and Salvanes (2009) reproduce the Lochner and Moretti (2004) IV results for black
males using the same estimation strategy with a slightly different specification and an expanded
sample that includes men ages 25-64 from the 1950-80 U.S. Censuses.20 Their estimate suggests that
an additional year of completed schooling reduces incarceration rates among black men by about 20%.
Machin, Marie, and Vujic (2010) exploit two national changes in minimum schooling ages in the
United Kingdom (taking place in 1947 and 1973) to estimate the effects of schooling on criminal convictions for property crimes over the period 1984-2002. Identification for their IV estimates effectively
comes from two separate cohort-level differences in schooling attainment and crime for cohorts surrounding the law changes.21 Among men, they estimate that a one-year increase in average schooling
20

Most notably, they do not include state and state-specific year effects in their specification. They also remove
individuals with greater than twelve years of schooling from their sample. Their measures of compulsory schooling ages
differ as well, incorporating the fact that some states allow for exceptions to the dropout age under certain conditions.
21
They estimate models aggregated to the year-age level for individuals ages 16-59 from 1984-2002. To alleviate
concerns that other important economic or social factors may have changed around the same time as the two increases in
compulsory schooling ages, they include a rich set of covariates: year and age indicators, fraction male, fraction employed,
fraction non-white, and fraction living in London.
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levels reduces conviction rates for property crime by about 30%, more than twice the effect estimated
by Lochner and Moretti (2004) for the U.S.
Buonanno and Leonida (2009) estimate the effects of educational attainment on crime rates in
Italy using regional panel data from 1980-95. Their unit of observation is a region-year (they examine
20 Italian regions), and they estimate a restricted form of equation (6) using OLS. Specifically, they
control for region and time fixed effects (dl and dt ), along with region-specific quadratic time trends
(assuming dlt = δ1l t+δ2l t2 ), and a rich set of time-varying region-specific covariates.22 These estimates
are identified from the relationship between changes in regional education levels and crime rates
(around smooth regional time trends). Their estimates suggest that a ten percentage point increase in
high school graduation rates would reduce property crime rates by 4% and total crime rates by about
3%. (Effects on property crime are statistically significant, while effects on total crime are not.) They
find no evidence to suggest that university completion reduces crime.23
Merlo and Wolpin (2009) take a very different approach to estimating the relationship between
schooling and subsequent crime. Using individual-level panel data on black males ages 13-22 from the
NLSY, they estimate a discrete choice vector autoregression model in which individuals can choose to
engage in crime, attend school, and/or work each year.24 These decisions are allowed to depend on
unobserved individual-specific returns to each activity, as well as crime, schooling, and work choices
the previous year. Using estimates for their model, Merlo and Wolpin simulate the effects of changing
youth schooling status at age 16 on subsequent outcomes. Their estimates suggest that, on average,
attending school at age 16 reduces the probability a black male ever commits a crime over ages 19-22
by 13 percentage points and the probability of an arrest over those ages by 6 percentage points. These
represent 42% and 23% reductions in self-reported crime and arrest rates, respectively, for black males
not in school at age 16.
A final study worth mentioning examines the effects of an explicit education subsidy on youth
burglary rates in England. Between 1999 and 2002, England piloted Educational Maintenance Allowances (EMA), which provided subsidies of up to £40 per week (plus bonuses for completion of
coursework) for low-income 16-18 year old youth to attend school. The program was administered in
15 local areas with low schooling participation rates. During the same time period, the Reducing Burglary Initiative (RBI) funded 63 different local burglary reduction schemes as a separate pilot project.
22

Covariates include employment rates, GDP per capita, GDP growth rates, average wage rates, the fraction of crimes
without an arrest, police per capita, and the length of time in the judicial process.
23
Buonanno and Leonida (2009) also generalize their econometric specification to allow for an effect of lagged crime rates
on current crime rates, estimating this using a generalized method of moments estimator to account for the endogeneity
of lagged crime rates. This specification produces similar estimated effects of schooling on crime.
24
Crime, work, and school are not mutually exclusive activities in this framework – individuals can do any combination
of these three activities in each year. An individuals is said to have engaged in crime in any year if they self-reported
any of the following offenses: theft, other property crime, sold drugs, or assault.
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Roughly half of all EMA pilot areas were also selected for the RBI. Sabates and Feinstein (2007) use
a differences-in-differences strategy to identify the effects of each pilot program as well as the combination of the two on burglary. Specifically, they compare changes in burglary conviction rates before
and after the introduction of RBI, EMA, or both against a set of comparison areas. While baseline
burglary conviction rates were much higher in EMA and EMA-RBI combined areas relative to the
comparison areas, annual growth rates in burglary conviction rates prior to the programs were quite
similar across all three classifications. To reduce concerns about differences between the treated and
untreated areas, Sabates and Feinstein control for a number of time-varying area-specific factors likely
to affect crime and limit their sample of comparison areas to those that best ‘match’ the distribution of
demographic characteristics in the pilot areas.25 Their findings suggest that the combination of both
the EMA and RBI significantly reduced burglary rates by 1.3 per 1,000 youth (about 5.5%) relative
to the ‘matched’ comparison areas. Effects of the EMA alone were slightly lower but still significant.
While there are obvious concerns about the extent to which time-varying determinants of burglary are
the same for treated and comparison areas, Sabates and Feinstein (2007) show that estimated effects
on burglary rates for 19-21 year olds (who were not offered the education subsidy) were much lower
and statistically insignificant.

3.2

School Quality and Crime

If human capital acquisition, socialization, or preference modification are important mechanisms determining the impacts of educational attainment on crime, then it is likely that school quality and
the type of schools students attend also affect criminal behavior. While there are no studies which
directly estimate the effects of measured school quality on crime, three recent studies on school choice
and desegregation provide some useful insights.
Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2006) and Deming (2009a) examine the importance of school choice
in large urban U.S. school districts (Chicago and Charlotte-Mecklenburg, respectively) on a variety
of student outcomes, including delinquency and crime. Both studies examine the effects ‘winning’ a
randomized lottery for admission to schools children selectively apply to.26 By comparing the outcomes
for youth who win vs. lose a particular school admission lottery, they estimate the effects of being
offered admission to that school relative to the preferred alternative. This reflects the ‘intention to
treat’ (i.e. the effects of being offered the opportunity to attend better schools) and not necessarily
25
Their regressions control for unemployment rates for individuals under 25, proportion of students eligible for free
school meals, number of qualified teachers, pupil-teacher ratios, and the number of supplementary staff for ethnic minorities, percent of youth with no schooling qualifications as of age 16 (i.e. dropouts), and the percent of unauthorized
half-days missed in secondary school. We discuss results based on the ‘matched’ sample of comparison areas.
26
In both cases, students could always choose to attend their neighborhood school. If any additional positions were
available in a school, an open enrollment lottery was run based on all other students who applied to that school/program.
Lotteries were random within population subgroups (e.g. by race or family income).
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the effects of actually attending that school, since many students did not ultimately enroll in schools
for which they were admitted by lottery. However, both studies find that ‘winning’ a lottery does
significantly increase enrollment in that school. Since many students applying outside their assigned
local school are from disadvantaged backgrounds and neighborhoods, on average, lottery winners end
up attending better quality schools, as measured by such things as student achievement scores, value
added (i.e. growth in achievement), student behavioral problems, or teacher quality. In this sense, these
studies offer an opportunity to examine the effects of school quality, broadly defined, on delinquency
and crime.
Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2006) find that winning a high school lottery in Chicago significantly
raises peer graduation rates by 6% and the share of peers who test above national norms by about
14%; however, lottery winners appear to be placed in lower tracked classes within the better schools.
Interestingly, they find no evidence that lottery winners perform better on a wide range of academic
measures (e.g. math and reading tests, enrollment, days absent) and some evidence that they are more
likely to drop out of high school. The latter may be due to a mismatch between student ability and
school demands. Despite the disappointing findings regarding academic outcomes, students who won
lotteries to high achievement Chicago public schools reported nearly 60% fewer arrests on a ninth
grade student survey. These winners also reported getting into less trouble at school, and school
administrative data suggests that they had lower incarceration rates during school ages. Of course,
it is possible that schools themselves affect student arrest and incarceration rates through differential
disciplinary policies (or criminal opportunities), so it is important to study whether these reductions
in arrests/incarceration persist beyond high school.
To this end, Deming (2009a) examines the impacts of open enrollment lotteries (for middle and
high schools) on adult criminal outcomes seven years after random assignment.27 Given his interest
in the effects of school choice on crime, he categorizes males based on their likelihood of arrest, which
he estimates as a function of demographic characteristics, earlier math and reading test scores, and
other school-related behaviors at young ages. For his entire sample of middle and high school lottery
participants, ‘high-risk’ youth (defined as those in the top quintile of predicted arrest probability) have
seven times more felony arrests (seven years after random assignment) than the average student from
the bottom four quintiles combined.
Like Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2006), Deming (2009a) estimates significant effects of winning a
school lottery on the quality of school attended, especially among ‘high-risk’ youth, but no effects on
achievement tests. There appears to be some effect on student enrollment during high school years,
27

He merges Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district data with data on adult (ages 16+) arrests and incarceration from
Mecklenburg County and the North Carolina Department of Corrections.

19

but there is no evidence that ‘high-risk’ lottery winners are more likely to graduate from high school.28
Among high school lottery winners in the high-risk category, Deming (2009a) estimates a significant
0.35 (roughly 45%) reduction in the number of adult felony arrests (cumulative as of seven years after
the lottery) with an associated savings in victimization costs of $4,600-16,600.29 Because many crimes
do not lead to an arrest, the total benefits to potential victims and society are likely to be much larger.
His estimates suggest that winning middle school lotteries also reduces crime among high-risk youth
with most effects of a similar order of magnitude.
Court-ordered school desegregation policies enacted since Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka
in 1954 dramatically altered the types of schools blacks attended in many American districts. In
most cases, the resources and average student achievement of schools attended by blacks would have
improved markedly.30 Guryan (2004) estimates that these desegregation efforts significantly increased
high school graduation rates among blacks by 2-3 percentage points but had no effect on white graduation rates. Weiner, Lutz and Ludwig (2009) examine whether these changes affected county-level
homicide rates.31 Their estimates suggest that homicide deaths among blacks ages 15-19 declined
by 17% in the first five years after court-ordered desegregation, while homicide deaths among white
15-19 year olds declined by about 23%. Homicide deaths among slightly older whites and blacks also
declined. In looking at offenders, they find that arrest rates for homicide declined by one-third for
blacks ages 15-19, while there was no decline for young whites. Combining Guryan’s (2004) estimated
effect on high school graduation rates with the estimated effects of schooling on crime from Lochner
and Moretti (2004), they argue that much of the effect may be coming from the increased schooling
among blacks associated with desegregation.
For some perspective, it is interesting to compare these findings with those from the Moving-toOpportunity (MTO) experiment, which provided housing vouchers to low-income families to move
out of high poverty neighborhoods. Evaluations of MTO report that families receiving the housing
vouchers moved into neighborhoods with about 25% lower poverty rates; however, these moves only
led to modest improvements in the quality of schools youth attended and no improvements in their
cognitive achievement (Sanbonmatsu, et al. 2006). Kling, Ludwig, and Katz (2005) report that the
MTO housing vouchers led to lasting reductions in arrests for both violent and property offenses
among young females, short-term reductions in violent crime arrests for males, and delayed increases
28

There is more evidence of effects on high school graduation and college attendance among the lower risk quintiles.
These victimization costs (in year 2009 dollars) assign costs based on the type of offense using cost estimates from
Miller, Cohen and Wiersema (1996). They do not include justice system or enforcement costs. The larger figure uses a
cost of $4.3 million for murder while the smaller uses a value of $125,000 (twice the cost of rape).
30
For example, Reber (2007) shows that integration efforts in Louisiana from 1965-70 were accompanied by large
increases in per pupil funding for black students.
31
They use data on homicide death by year and county over the period 1958-88 from vital statistics and data on
homicide victims and arrestees from the Supplemental Homicide Report from 1976-2003.
29
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in property crime arrests for males. Overall, any reductions in crime were modest at best.
Taken together, these studies suggest that simply improving the schools attended by disadvantaged
youth appears to be much more successful in reducing criminal activity (though not necessarily in
improving academic outcomes) than changing neighborhoods. Given the mixed findings on educational
attainment levels (with modest positive effects at best), the impacts of better schools on crime appear
to be driven largely by school quality and not ‘quantity’. Whether it is the quality of teachers and
instruction or of student peers is less obvious. The fact that test scores did not improve among lottery
winners suggests that the main effects of attending ‘better’ schools on delinquency and crime are likely
to be attributed to better socialization, better peer interactions, improvements in non-cognitive skills,
or changes in preferences. It is, therefore, interesting that substantial improvements in ‘neighborhood
peers’ do not yield the same benefits in terms of crime reduction.

3.3

Contemporaneous Schooling and Crime

We now consider the relationship between contemporaneous schooling and crime. As noted earlier,
there are three main ways in which altering youth’s schooling attendance is likely to affect their contemporaneous engagement in crime: (i) incapacitation, (ii) raising the costs of future punishment
through human capital accumulation, and (iii) social interactions facilitated by bringing youth together. The incapacitation and human capital effects of schooling on crime are likely to be negative,
while the sign of the social interaction effect is theoretically ambiguous.
Three relatively recent studies shed light on these effects by estimating the impacts of different
‘interventions’ that directly affect youth schooling attendance.32 Anderson (2009) examines the effects
of increasing state compulsory schooling ages on crime among affected youth (i.e. forcing some youth
to stay in school), while Jacob and Lefgren (2003) and Luallen (2006) estimate the effects of extra
days off from school due to teacher in-service days or teacher strikes (i.e. keeping youth out of school).
The policies analyzed by these studies differ in two important respects. First, increases in compulsory
schooling ages typically ‘require’ students to stay in school at least one additional year and sometimes
more, whereas teacher in-service days and strikes are of very short duration. Second, while teacher
strikes and in-service days release all students from school, changes in compulsory schooling laws
typically affect a small set of marginal students. All three potential effects of school attendance on
crime are likely to be relevant to changes in compulsory schooling, while the effects of in-service
days and teacher strikes are likely to be limited to incapacitation and social interactions. Any social
interaction effects are likely to be magnified in the latter cases due to the universal nature of the policy.
32
Using individual-level data, earlier studies by Gottfredson (1985), Farrington, et al. (1986), and Witte and Tauchen
(1994) explore the cross-sectional relationship between time spent in school and contemporaneous crime, concluding that
time spent in school significantly ‘reduces’ criminal activity. Unfortunately, these findings are difficult to interpret given
the simultaneous nature of the crime and schooling choices.
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Rather than use changes in compulsory schooling laws as instruments for educational attainment,
Anderson (2009) estimates the direct effect of these laws on contemporaneous county-level arrest rates
(from the UCR) from 1980 to 2006 among affected youth ages 16-18. Specifically, his estimates are
identified from within-county fluctuations in arrests (around county-specific trends) for 16-18 year-olds
(relative to 13-15 year-olds) over time as state compulsory schooling ages change.
Anderson’s estimates for total arrest rates imply that a compulsory schooling age of 17 significantly
reduces age 17 arrests by about 8% (5.4 arrests per 1,000 youth) compared to a compulsory schooling
age of 16 or less. Similarly, an age 18 compulsory schooling age significantly reduces arrests by 9.711.5% at ages 16-18. Separating arrests by type of offense, he estimates that compulsory schooling laws
significantly reduce both property and violent arrests for 16-18 year olds. Although, estimated effects
of schooling age laws on drug-related crimes are sizeable, the effects are typically not statistically
significant. Overall, the estimates generally suggest that forcing youth to spend an extra year or two
in high school significantly reduces their arrest rates over that period.
Jacob and Lefgren (2003) examine the effects of single day changes in school-wide attendance on
juvenile crime and arrest rates in 29 large American cities from 1995 to 1999. Exploiting teacher
in-service days across jurisdictions over time as an exogenous source of variation in school days, they
essentially compare local juvenile crime rates on days when school is not in session to those when it is.33
Their findings suggest that an additional day of school reduces serious juvenile property crime by about
14% that day while it increases serious juvenile violent crime by 28%. These results are consistent with
an ‘incapacitation effect’ of school that limits participation in property crime. However, the increased
level of interaction among adolescents facilitated through schools may raise the likelihood of violent
conflicts (and other minor delinquency) after school. Interestingly, they find no evidence to suggest
that school days simply shift crime to other days without changing overall crime rates.
Luallen (2006) follows a similar approach, using teacher strikes (typically lasting about 5 days)
rather than in-service days as an exogenous source of school days. Using data from the state of
Washington for 1980-2001, Luallen (2006) estimates that an extra day of school reduces arrests for
property crimes by about 29% while increasing arrests for violent crimes by about 32% in urban areas.
The effect on property crime is roughly double the effect estimated in Jacob and Lefgren (2003), while
the effect on violent crime is quite similar. In rural and suburban areas, Luallen finds insignificant
effects on both violent and property crime arrests. Thus, the incapacitation and social interaction
effects appear to be particularly strong in urban areas and negligible elsewhere.
33
Their main specification includes controls to account for the possibility that crime may be higher on certain days of
the week or that different cities may experience different monthly crime cycles.
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4

Evidence on Human Capital-Based Interventions from Birth to
Young Adulthood

A growing body of evidence suggests that early childhood and school-age interventions can reduce
adult crime rates. Most famously, the High/Scope Perry Preschool Program substantially lowered
arrest rates through age 40 for a sample of low-income minority children in Ypsilanti, Michigan.
Several other early childhood interventions have produced similar effects on delinquency; however,
others have not. We briefly review studies of early childhood and school-age interventions that have
analyzed educational and criminal/delinquency outcomes during late adolescence or adulthood.34 We
then discuss a few programs aimed at improving school participation among adolescents or that directly
provide training to adolescents and young adults.
Table 2 summarizes four small-scale early childhood interventions (Abecedarian Project, Chicago
Child Parent Center (CPC), High/Scope Perry Preschool, and Infant Health and Development Program (IHDP)), their target populations, study methodology, and estimated effects on educational
attainment and crime at ages 18 or older. All of the programs included a preschool component, ranging from full-time full-year care from birth to kindergarten (Abecedarian) to half-day preschool at ages
3 and 4 (Chicago CPC and Perry Preschool). Perry Preschool and IHDP also included regular home
visits at preschool ages as part of their curriculums.35 All of the programs targeted youth facing some
form of disadvantage. Abecedarian and Perry Preschool specifically targeted children at-risk of having
problems developing normally in school. Children enrolling in the Chicago CPC were all minorities
selected from families with low socioeconomic status (SES). IHDP drew from a more heterogeneous
population, targeting pre-term children born of low birth-weight (less than 2500g). Overall, these studies cover a reasonably broad range of potential preschool-based interventions and target populations.
(We discuss findings for Head Start below.)
Youth from all four of these programs were followed until at least age 18, enough time to determine
whether the programs have medium-term effects on the education and criminal behavior of participants. Only the Chicago CPC was not evaluated using randomized trials; however, Reynolds, et al.
(2001) use a strong design of matching treated children with other comparison children based on age of
kindergarten entry, eligibility for and participation in government funded programs, and neighborhood
and family poverty. Children from the matched comparison sample would also have been eligible for
the program had they lived in a neighborhood with a center. Sample sizes range from around one
34

See Karoly, et al. (1998) or Blau and Currie (2006) for more comprehensive surveys of early childhood programs.
All of the programs typically provided other additional services to families and children (e.g. nutritional and health
services). While a subsample of the Abecedarian participants received an extended school-age intervention for the first
few years of school, we focus on the preschool component of the program. The additional school-age services did not
substantially impact the educational attainment or crime outcomes discussed here.
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hundred children for Perry Preschool to thirteen hundred for Chicago CPC.
Both Chicago CPC and Perry Preschool significantly increased high school completion rates overall;
however, the Chicago CPC had more sizeable effects on male graduation rates while Perry Preschool
only raised female graduation rates (Reynolds, et al. 2001, Schweinhart, et al. 2005). The IHDP had
no effect on high school dropout rates by age 18, while Abecedarian increased college attendance but
not high school completion (McCormick, et al. 2006, Campbell, et al. 2002). These programs typically
produced short-term gains in achievement scores and sometimes generated lasting gains.
The final column of Table 2 reports estimated effects of these programs on late juvenile and adult
crime. As alluded to above, Perry Preschool had significant effects on lifetime crime measured as of age
40 (Schweinhart, et al. 2005). Reductions in the fraction arrested five or more times were substantial
for both males and females. Both showed reductions of about one-third; however, the size of the
effect in absolute terms is much larger for males given their higher baseline crime rate. Reductions in
crime for Perry Preschool students were observed across a broad range of crimes (e.g. drug, property,
and violent crimes) and were apparent even at younger ages. The Chicago CPC also reduced arrest
rates (by age 18) by about one-third (Reynolds, et al. 2001). Another widely cited family support and
preschool program, the Syracuse University Family Development Research Program, showed significant
reductions in juvenile delinquency measured at a slightly earlier age: 6% of preschool participants had
been placed under probation services by age 15 compared to 22% of controls (Lally, et al. 1988).36
The estimated savings in reduced criminal justice expenditures and victimization costs resulting from
the crime reductions of Perry Preschool and Chicago CPC are sizeable. Using a 3% discount rate,
Belfield, et al. (2006) estimate that the Perry Preschool produced a social benefit of over $150,000
(year 2000 dollars) per child from crime reduction alone.37 Reynolds, et al. (2002) estimate that
reductions in juvenile crime through age 18 associated with the Chicago CPC saved society roughly
$8,000. Findings like these, especially those for Perry Preschool, led Donohue and Siegelman (1998)
to conclude that small, rigorous early intervention programs may pay for themselves through reduced
crime rates alone, if they can be targeted to high-crime groups.
Not all early childhood programs in Table 2 yield reductions in crime. While modest reductions in
self-reported convictions and incarceration through age 21 were observed for Abecedarian, none of these
36

The Elmira Nurse Home Visitation Program provided home visits by nurses to first-time mothers who were young,
unmarried, or of low SES. Nurses visited homes for randomly assigned mothers during pregnancy and for the first two
years of the child’s life. Olds, et al. (1998) report mixed but encouraging effects of the program on delinquency at age
15: treated youth were more likely to self-report being stopped by the police but had fewer incidences of arrests and
convictions.
37
This figure is for benefits through age 40. Using a 7% discount rate produces a social benefit from crime of about
$67,000 (Belfield, et al. 2006). Heckman, et al. (2009) report that savings from crime reduction account for about 4065% of the benefit-cost ratio for Perry Preschool, depending on assumptions about discount rates (0-7%) and the cost of
murder.
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effects are statistically significant (Campbell, et al. 2002). Based on administrative records of adult
criminal charges in North Carolina, Clarke and Campbell (1998) report nearly identical rates of arrests
and criminal charges (as of age 21, on average) for treatment and control children in the Abecedarian
study. Similarly, IHDP produced no significant effects on crime through age 18 (McCormick, et al.
2006).
What is different about Abecedarian and IHDP that these programs did not produce the same
reductions in crime? It is difficult to point to any particular curriculum difference; although, not all
preschools are alike. Abecedarian began preschool at infancy and continued through kindergarten –
the longest of any program. It was also full-day year-round, unlike Perry Preschool or Chicago CPC.
Like Perry Preschool, it showed sizeable gains in achievement and IQ, so it is difficult to attribute
its lack of effects on crime to inadequate intervention. The only obvious program difference between
Abecedarian and Perry Preschool or Chicago CPC that might explain the absence of any impact on
crime is its lack of a ‘home visit’ component, but IHDP included home visits by nurses from birth
through three years of age. IHDP began early but also ended when Perry Preschool and Chicago CPC
began (age 3), so it is possible that the early ‘home visit’ combined with later preschool care is a key
combination of services necessary for long-term impacts on delinquency and crime.
An alternative hypothesis is that the environments more than the specifics of the programs were
important in determining impacts on crime. Chapel Hill is a mid-sized mostly white and relatively
affluent university city in the South, while Ypsilanti is a smaller industrial city with a sizeable minority
population. Chicago CPC sites were in low-income neighborhoods in a large urban midwestern city.
(IHDP had sites throughout the U.S.) It seems quite possible that the same program might have
different effects in each city. As noted by Barnett and Masse (2007), crime rates were 70% higher in
Ypsilanti than Chapel Hill when the respective program participants would have been age 15. They
speculate that there may have been little crime to prevent among the Abecedarian sample; however,
Clarke and Cambpell (1998) report that the two control samples (Perry and Abecedarian) had very
similar arrest rates (around 40%) by their early 20s. McCormick, et al. (2006) report that juvenile
arrest rates among controls were similar for the IHDP and Chicago CPC as well. So, among the
target populations for these programs, crime rates were fairly similar even if local crime rates were
quite different. Of course, it is possible that the long-term effects of early childhood programs depend
as much on the environment in which participants grow up as on individual and family characteristics
of the participants themselves. If so, it is important to exercise caution in extrapolating benefits from
any single program or community to the wider population.
Despite the fact that children targeted by all programs were disadvantaged, there is a sizeable
difference in baseline educational attainment levels between Abecedarian and IHDP on the one hand
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and Chicago CPC and Perry Preschool on the other. High school graduation rates were 70% among
Abecedarian controls; dropout rates (as of age 18) were only 10% among the IHDP controls. These
both compare quite favorably with Chicago CPC and Perry Preschool controls who had high school
completion rates ranging from 30-50%. Neither IHDP nor Abecedarian increased high school graduation rates. While Abecedarian improved college attendance rates, this does not appear to be an
important margin for crime (see Figure 1). Given the tight link between high school dropout and
crime discussed earlier, it may not be particularly surprising that Abecedarian and IHDP did not reduce crime given their negligible effects on high school completion. Yet, Perry Preschool substantially
reduced male crime rates without raising educational attainment among males. Clearly, early interventions may reduce delinquency and criminal behavior without significantly improving final schooling
outcomes.
In the end, there is no easy explanation for the different findings across studies. While the results
from these studies are individually powerful given their research designs (most are based on random
assignment), it is difficult to draw strong conclusions overall about the efficacy of early childhood
interventions as a national crime-fighting strategy. The fact that sample sizes are quite modest and
that program populations are not necessarily representative of the U.S. raises additional questions.
This itself may explain some of the variation in findings across studies. It is natural to ask how
these programs would affect other populations. Questions about scalability have also been raised: can
these programs and their effects be reproduced at a larger scale? These issues have led a number of
researchers to analyze the largest early childhood program in the U.S.: Head Start. This program
targets children from low-income families usually living in low-income communities and has served
hundreds of thousands of children throughout the U.S. since its inception in 1967.
Because no large-scale long-term random assignment studies of Head Start are available, researchers
have employed non-experimental methods. These studies generally examine impacts on national samples of individuals served by Head Start, using data from the Panel Survey of Income and Dynamics
(PSID) or Children of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (CNLSY). We next discuss those
studies that examine the impacts of Head Start on behavioral problems, delinquency, or measures of
adult crime.
Garces, Thomas, and Currie (2002) and Deming (2009b) use a family fixed effects approach to
estimate the effects of Head Start on a variety of long-term outcomes. By comparing siblings who did
and did not attend a Head Start program at ages 3-5, they address important concerns about permanent or long-run differences across families that may affect decisions about preschool or Head Start
enrollment.38 Garces, Thomas, and Currie (2002) use data from the PSID, examining adult outcomes
38

Of course, they leave unanswered the question as to why some siblings enroll in Head Start while others from the
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for individuals born between 1964 and 1977, while Deming (2009b) uses data from the CNLSY and
examines outcomes for individuals born in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Despite using the same
empirical approach, the two studies find quite different patterns for Head Start impacts on educational
attainment and criminal behavior. Garces, Thomas, and Currie (2002) estimate significant increases
in high school completion (by 20 percentage points) and college attendance (by 28 percentage points)
for whites only, while Deming (2009b) estimates an 11 percentage point increase in high school completion rates and a 14 percentage point increase in college attendance for blacks only. Excluding GED
recipients, Deming (2009b) estimates a smaller (7 percentage points) and statistically insignificant effect on high school completion for blacks, suggesting that much of their apparent improvement in high
school completion is due to increases in the GED.39 Regarding crime, estimates by Garces, Thomas,
and Currie (2002) suggest that Head Start reduces the probability of being booked or charged with a
crime by about 12 percentage points among blacks, with no effect on whites. Deming (2009b) finds
no significant effects of Head Start on crime for blacks or whites.40
Carneiro and Ginja (2008) use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the effects of Head
Start on adolescent outcomes, including the probability that someone is sentenced for a crime. Their
approach exploits the fact that Head Start imposes strict eligibility criteria related to family income
and structure: children ages 3-5 are eligible if family income is below the federal poverty guidelines
or if the family is eligible for public assistance. Since these criteria vary across states and time, the
income thresholds vary across these dimensions as well. They exploit this exogenous variation in
eligibility, assuming the effects of family income (when children are ages 3-5) on subsequent outcomes
are continuous. Using data from the CNLSY on youth who would have enrolled in Head Start during
the 1980s and 1990s, they estimate that participation in Head Start at ages 3-5 significantly reduces
the probability (by 31 percentage points) a 16-17 year-old male is sentenced for a crime (based on
self-reports). They estimate similar effects for a sample of blacks only. These estimates measure the
effect of Head Start on children who were at the margin of eligibility for the program and, therefore,
represent the effects we might expect with modest expansions of the program.
Altogether, the non-experimental evidence on Head Start appears to suggest some long-term effects
on education and crime, but findings vary in important ways across studies.41 The strongest effects
same family do not and, more importantly, whether different enrollment decisions are related to underlying differences
in child abilities or other factors that may affect outcomes later in life.
39
The substitution between high school degrees and GED receipt is less relevant for the earlier cohort studied by
Garces, Thomas, and Currie (2002), since the GED was much less common in the 1980s relative to more recent years.
40
His measure of crime is an indicator equal to one if the respondent reports having been convicted of a crime, been
on probation, sentenced by a judge, or is in prison at the time of the interview.
41
While Head Start may affect juvenile and adult crime even if it has no effect on educational attainment (as with
males in the Perry Preschool program), one might speculate that any increases in schooling (especially high school years)
associated with Head Start should lead to reductions in crime as estimated by Lochner and Moretti (2004). Under this
assumption, estimates from Ludwig and Miller (2007), which suggest that roughly doubling Head Start spending (per
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on crime appear to exist for blacks; although, Deming (2009) finds no effect on crime for either blacks
or whites. Combined with the evidence from smaller scale programs evaluated by randomized trials,
there is limited but important evidence that early childhood interventions can reduce crime later in
life for youth from disadvantaged backgrounds.
A recent program, Fast Track, introduced in four sites around the U.S., provides group- and
individual-based services to children from grades one through ten. The program specifically targets
children from high crime and poverty neighborhoods who exhibit conduct problems in kindergarten,
with the primary aim of preventing antisocial behavior and psychiatric disorders. The program focuses on three elements of development: social and cognitive skills, peer relationships, and parenting.
During early grades, parents were offered training and home visits to help improve parenting skills,
while children were engaged in group activities to foster friendships and tutoring sessions in reading.
As children aged, more individualized services were provided, along with group sessions aimed at
dealing with the transition to middle school, resistance to drugs, etc. The program also incorporated
a classroom intervention during grades 1-5 at schools with program children. Teachers implemented
2-3 sessions per week designed to promote social and emotional competence and to reduce aggression.
Experimental estimates based on random assignment suggest that the program produced sustained
improvements in conduct disorders and anti-social behavior over grades 3-9 (Conduct Problems Prevention Research Group, CPPRG, 2007). As of grade 9, high risk youth (those from the top 3% of
conduct problems in kindergarten) receiving the Fast Track program showed significant reductions in
self-reported delinquency and criminal behavior; however, no significant effects on anti-social behavior
were found for other youth.42 Two recent follow-up studies (CPPRG 2010a, 2010b) suggest that the
reductions in crime and conduct problems extend at least two years beyond the conclusion of the
program (last measured at grade 12/age 19) and continue to be focused on youth that were initially
‘high risk’. Effects on juvenile conduct disorders did not appear to decline after the program, while
effects on crime showed some fade-out.
Experimental evaluations of two earlier, more limited elementary school-age interventions are worth
commenting on, since they also focused largely on social development among ‘high-risk’ children. The
Montreal Longitudinal Experimental Study provided social skills training to first and second grade
capita) increases high school completion rates by as much as four percentage points, imply that this policy should also
reduce arrest rates by up to 3-4%. Of course, multiplying the Garces, Thomas, and Currie (2002) estimated effects of
Head Start on schooling attainment among whites by Lochner and Moretti’s (2004) estimated effects of education on
crime suggests that Head Start attendance should significantly reduce incarceration rates among whites, while analogous
estimates from Deming (2009b) suggest that Head Start should reduce crime among blacks. Yet, these studies estimated
no effect of Head Start attendance on self-reported measures of arrest, conviction, or incarceration rates for these
populations.
42
Results for anti-social behavior are based on an index created from self-reports of serious delinquent/criminal actions
like stealing something worth more than $100, assault, selling heroin or LSD, and sexual assault.
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children, along with teacher and parent training over those same years. Boisjoli, et al. (2007) report
that by age 24, children receiving the intervention (compared to control children) were twice as likely
to have completed high school and only half as likely to have a criminal record. The Seattle Social
Development Project intervened over a longer period (grades 1-6); however, it only provided teacher
and parent training (aimed at improving child social and emotional skill development). As of age 21,
Hawkins, et al. (2005) estimate that the six-year intervention had increased high school graduation
rates from 81 to 91 percent and significantly reduced self-reported crime and official lifetime court
charges (from 53 to 42 percent).
Altogether, the evidence from Fast Track, the Montreal Longitudinal Experimental Study, and
the Seattle Social Development Project suggests that comprehensive school-age programs designed to
improve social development can produce lasting impacts on educational attainment, conduct disorders,
and criminal behavior. In many ways, these programs emphasized social over cognitive development
relative to the preschool programs summarized in Table 2. Of course, both sets of programs were
broad-based and yielded improvements in both domains.43
Programs targeted to older adolescents and young adults have shown mixed results. The Quantum
Opportunity Program provided entering high school students with a mentor/tutor that aided them in
schoolwork and community activities for four years. Financial incentives designed to encourage high
school graduation and college enrollment were provided for educational, service, and developmental
activities. A recent random assignment evaluation of the program reported no significant improvements
in schooling or reductions in crime six years after scheduled high school graduation (Schirm, Stuart,
and McKie 2006). In part, this may be due to the relatively low participation by youth in program
activities.44
The Job Corps provides intensive basic educational and vocational training for economically disadvantaged youth and young adults ages 16-24 throughout the U.S. The program also offers a wide
range of other services (e.g. counseling, social skills training, health education, job placement services).
The average participant is enrolled for about 8 months, with most living in residence at training sites.
The program’s primary goal is to improve employment and earnings prospects. Based on a recent
random assignment evaluation, Schochet, Burghardt and Glazerman (2001) conclude that the program produced modest positive impacts on post-program employment and earnings. The program
also reduced self-reported arrest rates by about 30% during the first year after random assignment,
when most youth would have been enrolled. Reductions in subsequent years were smaller and statis43
This is largely consistent with recent estimates of skill production functions for both cognitive and ‘non-cognitive’
skills (e.g., see Cunha and Heckman 2008).
44
On average, youth spent only 177 hours per year on educational, community, and developmental activities. Roughly
one-in-four spent no time at all in these activities by the fourth year of the program.
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tically insignificant. The program also significantly reduced conviction rates by about 17% during the
four years following random assignment.45 Conclusions from the less-expensive and non-residential
JOBSTART program are largely consistent with these findings (Cave, et al. 1993).46
Collectively, these studies indicate that human capital-based interventions from early childhood to
early adulthood can reduce juvenile and adult crime, at least for some populations. To understand
why, it is useful to briefly return to the model laid out in Section 2 to aid in interpreting these findings.
The model suggests that effective interventions may reduce juvenile and adult crime by improving child
learning productivity, A, increasing adolescent human capital levels, H1 , or by socializing children (i.e.
lowering θ). While preschool programs highlighted in Table 2 may raise learning abilities, achievement
gains are generally short-lived and limited to primary school ages. Evidence of reduced criminal activity
among adolescents attributed to early intervention programs, suggests that these programs raise initial
market skills (H1 ) and/or reduce criminal returns (θ) through socialization. School-based programs
for high-risk youth like Fast Track emphasized social development (i.e. lowering θ) over cognitive
achievement; yet, they also likely improved adolescent human capital levels H1 . Despite the difference
in emphasis between the two types of programs, both have shown the ability to significantly reduce
juvenile and adult crime. Job training programs for adolescents and young adults directly operate
on the incentives to invest in human capital (analogous to an increase in the subsidy rate s in our
model) and have led to modest reductions in crime during periods of heavy training. These programs
have produced only modest increases in earnings and negligible long-run effects on crime, however,
suggesting that simply training low-skilled adolescents does not provide the same promise as earlier
interventions that act on individual endowments.

5

Policy Lessons

In this section, we discuss a number of important policy lessons regarding human capital policies and
crime. First, we summarize evidence on the social savings from crime reduction that we might expect
from policies that increase educational attainment or enrollment, improve school choice and quality,
45

An earlier study by Long, et al. (1981) estimated that the social benefits from reduced criminal activity among Job
Corps participants amounted to over $7,000 (in 2008 dollars) per participant – almost 30% of the total social benefit of
the program.
46
JOBSTART offered many of the same basic components of the Job Corps to a similar population. Cave, et al. (1993)
find modest (and statistically insignificant) positive effects on earnings 3-4 years after random assignment for the full
sample; however, earnings increased roughly 25% (in years 3 and 4) for male participants with a prior arrest (i.e. had
an arrest since age 16 but prior to random assignment). Among male participants with no prior arrest, the program
significantly reduced self-reports of an arrest (6.4 percentage points or 36%) during the first year after random assignment
(i.e. the training year) but did not reduce the fraction arrested in subsequent years. Among males with a prior arrest,
the program (insignificantly) reduced the fraction reporting an arrest over the first four years after random assignment
by about 8% and had negligible effects on arrests during the first year. There were no significant effects on arrests for
female participants.
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or expand access to early childhood interventions. Second, we highlight a few sub-populations and
schooling margins that are likely to yield the greatest social gain from crime reduction. Finally, we
discuss a few other lessons based on the evidence.

5.1

Valuing the Social Benefits from Crime Reduction

Lochner and Moretti (2004) estimate that increasing educational attainment levels in the population
yields sizeable social benefits. Specifically, they calculate the social savings from crime reduction that
would result from a one percentage point increase in high school graduation rates in the U.S. Table 3
summarizes their exercise, translating all dollar values into 2008 dollars using the Consumer Price
Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U). Column 1 reports total costs per crime associated with
murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny/theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.47 Column 2
reports the predicted change in total U.S. arrests based on the Lochner and Moretti (2004) offensespecific arrest estimates discussed earlier and the total number of arrests in the 1990 Uniform Crime
Reports. Column 3 adjusts the arrest effect in column 2 by the number of crimes per arrest. In total,
nearly 100,000 fewer crimes would have taken place in 1990 if high school graduation rates had been
one percentage point higher. The implied social savings from reduced crime are shown in column
4. Savings from murder alone are as high as $1.7 billion. Savings from reduced assaults amount to
nearly $550 million. Because the estimates suggest that schooling increases rape and robbery offenses,
increased costs associated with these crimes partially offset the benefits from reductions in other
crimes.
The final row reports the total savings from reductions in all eight types of crime. Because these
figures only include a partial list of crimes (e.g. nearly 25% of all prisoners in 1991 were incarcerated for
drug offenses according to the U.S. Dept. of Justice (1994)) and do not include all costs associated with
each crime (e.g. private security measures are omitted), these amounts are likely to under-estimate
the true social benefit associated with increasing high school graduation rates. Still, the savings are
substantial: the social benefits of a one percentage point increase in male U.S. high school graduation
rates (from reduced crime alone) in 1990 would have amounted to more than $2 billion. This represents
more than $3,000 in annual savings per additional male graduate.
Open school enrollment lotteries and desegregation efforts also appear to reduce crime rates by
improving school quality. Deming (2009a) estimates that reductions in arrests associated with offering
better quality school options to a high-risk youth produces a roughly $16,000 social savings to victims
over the next seven years. Because better schools are also likely to have reduced crimes that never led
to an arrest, total victimization savings are likely to be even greater. Total social savings should be
47

These costs include incarceration and victim costs. See notes to Table 3 or Lochner and Moretti (2004) for details.
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still larger once savings on prisons and other crime prevention costs are factored in.
The effects of school attendance on contemporaneous juvenile crime rates are more complicated.
Studies estimating the effects of day-to-day changes in attendance suggest that in urban communities
additional school days reduce property crime while increasing violent crime (Jacob and Lefgren 2003,
Luallen 2006). Overall, the social costs associated with increased violence are likely to dominate
the benefits from reduced property crime. On the other hand, Anderson (2009) estimates reductions
in both violent and property juvenile crime associated with increases in compulsory schooling ages.
Thus, his findings suggest an overall social savings from juvenile crime reduction, although he does
not attempt to put a dollar value on the effects.
Evidence on the effects of early childhood and school-age interventions are mixed. Long-run impacts on juvenile delinquency and adult crime can be substantial for disadvantaged youth. For example, estimates suggest that Perry Preschool produced a social benefit from crime reduction of roughly
$150,000 per child (through age 40). On the other hand, Abecedarian produced no significant impacts
on crime. In choosing between programs or policies, it is, of course, important to incorporate the
wide-ranging benefits of early childhood programs (e.g. higher earnings, better health, etc.). Even if
early interventions are not more cost-effective in reducing crime when compared against more traditional law enforcement or justice system policies, they may provide greater total social value once all
benefits are considered.

5.2

Where are the Big Returns?

Given the most sizeable reductions in crime appear to result from the final years of high school, policies
that encourage high school completion would seem to be most promising in terms of their impacts
on crime.48 Because crime rates are already quite low among high school graduates, policies that
encourage college attendance or completion are likely to yield much smaller social benefits from crime
reduction; although, they may be desirable on other grounds.49
In general, policies designed to encourage schooling among more crime-prone groups are likely to
produce the greatest benefits from crime reduction. Consistent with this, the school-age Fast Track
program appears to have reduced juvenile crime only among very high-risk children, showing little
impact on even moderately high-risk children (CPPRG 2007, 2010b). Similarly, Deming (2009a) estimates that improved school choice for middle and high school students leads to significant reductions
in arrests for high-risk youth but not for others. As Donohue and Siegelman (1998) conclude, the over48

See Hanushek and Lindseth (2009), Jacob and Ludwig (2008), or Murnane (2008) for recent discussions of policies
to improve schooling outcomes in the U.S.
49
The fact that crime declines substantially with high school completion but not college attendance suggests that net
expected returns from crime for most individuals lie somewhere between the wages of high school dropouts and graduates.
See Freeman (1999) for a summary of evidence regarding criminal wages and earnings.
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all efficiency of early childhood programs as a crime-fighting strategy is likely to depend heavily on
the ability to target high-risk children at very young ages. The same is likely to be true for school-age
interventions.
Social benefits from crime reduction also vary across gender and race. Men commit much less
crime than women, on average. Thus, it is not surprising that crime-related benefits from education
policies and interventions are typically much smaller for females than males (e.g. Perry Preschool,
Job Corps). This is true even though programs sometimes reduce female and male crime rates by
similar amounts in percentage terms. While there are no studies to date comparing the impacts of
educational attainment on female vs. male crime rates, there would have to be a substantially larger
proportional effect on female crime rates to produce overall crime reductions to rival those estimated for
men. Among men, Lochner and Moretti (2004) estimate much larger effects of additional schooling on
incarceration rates among blacks relative to whites. Garces, Currie and Thomas (2002) estimate that
Head Start significantly reduces crime for blacks but not whites; however, Deming (2009b) estimates
no effect on crime for either group while Carneiro and Ginja (2008) estimate similar large effects on
both. Because crime rates are much higher among blacks than whites, on average, policies would
generally need to produce much larger proportional reductions in white crime rates to achieve similar
absolute reductions in crime. None of the evidence surveyed here suggests that this is the case.

5.3

Additional Policy Lessons

A few other useful lessons can be drawn from the studies surveyed here.
First, education policies reduce property crime as well as violent crime. In fact, the estimated
effects of educational attainment or school enrollment on property and violent offenses are often quite
similar in percentage terms (Lochner and Moretti 2004, Anderson 2009). Even murder appears to be
quite responsive to changes in educational attainment and school quality (Lochner and Moretti 2004,
Weiner, Lutz, and Ludwig 2009).
Second, higher wages increase the opportunity costs (including work foregone while incarcerated)
of both property and violent crime. Lochner and Moretti (2004) show that the estimated effects of
educational attainment on crime can largely be accounted for by the effects of schooling on wages
and the effects of wages on crime. This is important, since it suggests that policymakers can reduce
crime simply by increasing labor market skills; they need not alter individual preferences or otherwise
socialize youth. Of course, as evidence from the Job Corps and other training programs suggests, this
is not necessarily an easy task. Training programs targeted at low-skill adolescents and young adults
have modest (at best) effects on earnings and crime. On the other hand, encouraging youth to finish
high school (e.g. through compulsory schooling laws) appears to substantially increase earnings and
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reduce crime. Preventing early school dropout is likely to be more successful than trying to compensate
for dropout a few years later.
Third, education-based policies need not increase educational attainment to reduce crime. Studies
on school choice lotteries (Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt 2006, Deming 2009a) suggest that providing
disadvantaged urban youth with better schools can substantially reduce juvenile and adult crime,
even if it has small effects on educational outcomes. Perry Preschool had no effect on male schooling
levels but substantially reduced male crime rates through age 40 (Schweinhart, et al. 2005).
Fourth, evidence that violent crime is higher on school days than non-school days in urban districts
suggests that social interaction effects are particularly important for juvenile violent crime (Jacob and
Lefgren 2003, Luallen 2006). Smart policing efforts may be able to help address some of the problems
associated with schools releasing lots of adolescents at the same time. For example, an increased police
presence immediately after school or other major adolescent congregations let out may be warranted.
Or, on non-school days, it may be wise for police to focus more on targets or areas of juvenile property
crime, worrying less about violent crime. The ‘hot spot’ or ‘problem-oriented policing’ literature in
criminology suggests that informed targeting of police efforts to high crime areas (and, by extension,
times) can be effective at reducing overall crime rates.50 Alternatively, it may be useful to consider
ways of designing after-school youth programs or other weekend activities to minimize violent behavior
afterwards.

6

Conclusions

There is growing evidence that improvements in school quality and increases in educational attainment,
especially high school completion, reduce adult violent and property crime rates. Policies that induce
students to spend an extra year or more attending school also appear to reduce juvenile crime. These
findings are broadly consistent with a human capital-based model of crime and work. For most types
of crime, additional schooling is likely to raise legitimate wage rates much more than the returns
to crime, thereby discouraging the latter. Lochner and Moretti (2004) argue that the reductions in
violent and property crime associated with increased schooling is roughly equivalent to the effect of
education on wages multiplied by the effect of increased wages on crime. Thus, most of the effect
of education on violent and property crime may come from increased wages. By contrast, education
may increase the returns to white collar crime more than the returns to work. Consistent with this,
Lochner (2004) finds that arrest rates for white collar crime increase when education levels rise.
Education-based programs may also socialize youth, reducing personal or psychic rewards from
crime. Emphasizing social and emotional development, school-age programs like Fast Track have shown
50

For a recent survey of this literature, see Braga (2005).
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the ability to significantly reduce later conduct disorders and crime (among high-risk children). These
programs also improved educational outcomes, which may explain some of their impacts on crime.
Perry Preschool reduced male (and female) crime rates without affecting male schooling outcomes.
Thus, the program appears to have improved social development or increased early skill levels (without
noticeably affecting subsequent schooling investments). Evidence from school choice lotteries suggests
that improvements in school and peer quality can lead to reductions in crime without raising student
achievement or educational attainment. The most likely explanation for the reduction in crime is that
higher quality schools better socialize youth or provide them with a better set of peers. Yet, evidence
from the MTO experiment suggests that moving families to lower poverty neighborhoods does not
produce the same reductions in crime, complicating any explanation related to peer effects or social
networks.
Education may also increase patience or alter preferences for risk; however, neither seems to be
central to the estimated impacts on crime. Property crimes are generally associated with less than
one month of expected time in jail or prison conditional on being sentenced (see Table 1), hardly
enough time for modest changes in patience to play much of a role. Property crimes also have very
low expected probabilities of arrest (typically less than 10% chance) and even lower probabilities of
incarceration (typically less than 1%), so there is little actual uncertainty in outcomes associated with
these crimes (see Table 1). Yet, estimated impacts of schooling on property crime are similar to those
for violent crime, which entails much longer and more uncertain prison sentences.
Altogether, the evidence suggests that while efforts to socialize youth can be effective, simply
providing them with valuable market skills can discourage them from choosing a life of crime. In
terms of crime reduction, human capital-based policies that target the most disadvantaged (and crimeprone) are likely to be the most efficient, while also promoting a more equitable society. To that end,
increasing high school graduation rates and improving our nation’s worst inner city schools are likely
to yield the greatest social return.
Although policies that increase school attendance for a year or more (e.g. increased compulsory
schooling ages) appear to reduce both violent and property crime (Anderson 2009), a few extra days
off from school may actually lead to reductions in violent crime, especially in urban areas (Jacob and
Lefgren 2003, Luallen 2006). From a human capital perspective, the increased opportunities that open
up for youth attending an additional year of schooling should raise the future costs of incarceration
associated with juvenile crime. This may serve as an important additional criminal deterrent that
does not exist for day-to-day changes in the school calendar. In general, the effects of longer periods of
attendance on contemporaneous juvenile crime are consistent with the subsequent effects of additional
schooling on adult crime. The evidence on day-to-day changes in the school calendar highlights the
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possibility that by bringing many adolescents together, schools may foster negative interactions that
lead to violence after school is out. Schools may also bring youth together who then look for trouble
once they leave school grounds. Policies that find ways to address these problems may be effective at
reducing juvenile violence after school. For example, after-school programs may help keep youth busy
long enough to prevent some after-school violence, or they may simply delay the problems. Police
might be deployed differently on school days and non-school days, focusing on violent juvenile activity
on school days and juvenile property crime on non-school days.
There are many ways by which early childhood interventions may affect juvenile and adult crime.
The human capital approach favored in this chapter highlights the potential effects of these programs
on learning abilities, adolescent skill levels, and socialization or tastes for crime. These programs
may also affect childhood preferences, including risk aversion, patience, or self-control. While a few
early childhood programs have produced sizeable reductions in both juvenile and adult crime – most
famously, Perry Preschool – other quite similar programs have not. School-age interventions focused
on developing social and emotional skills have proven successful at reducing later conduct disorders
and crime, especially among very high-risk children. The benefits from reduced crime associated with
successful programs certainly warrant the attention they have received; yet, we still need to know
much more about why other programs have not produced the same effects. Is it the curriculum, the
population served, or the later school and post-school environment faced by program participants?
Two things are clear. First, preschool and school-age programs have substantially reduced crime for
some disadvantaged high-risk populations. Even if these gains cannot be expected in all cases, they
are large enough to warrant careful consideration on a broader scale. Second, successful programs did
not always increase educational attainment, even when they significantly reduced juvenile and adult
crime rates. Thus, disappointing achievement or educational outcomes need not imply the absence of
benefits from crime reduction.
Given current evidence, it is difficult to draw strong conclusions about the relative benefits of trying
to target and ‘treat’ children at very young ages vs. intervening at later ages to keep adolescents from
dropping out of high school. Of course, we need not choose one or the other. Indeed, both are likely to
be important components of a broad-based national crime-fighting agenda. Calculations by Lochner
and Moretti (2004) and Donohue and Seigelman (1998) suggest that both human capital-oriented
policies are competitive with more traditional law enforcement and incarceration efforts when all
benefits are considered.

36

Appendix: Comparative Statics Results
In this appendix, we derive comparative static results for the model discussed in the paper. We
first derive results for the ‘fully interior’ case where optimal investment and crime decisions satisfy
0 < I, c1 , I + c1 , c2 < 1. Then, we derive results for the case when adolescents choose not to work, so
optimal investment and crime satisfies I + c1 = 1 and 0 < I, c1 , c2 < 1.
Following the text, assume that N (·) and h(·) are twice continuously differentiable in all arguments
and that Nc > 0, Ncc < 0, Ncθ > 0, NH ≥ 0, NHH ≤ 0, NcH ≥ 0, hI > 0, hII < 0, hIH > 0, hIA > 0,
hH > 0, and hA ≥ 0.

Case 1: Working Adolescents
Define the individual objective function to be maximized with respect to I, c1 , c2 :
F (I, c1 , c2 ; A, H1 , θ, s) ≡ {H1 (1 − I − c1 ) + sI1 + N (c1 , H1 ; θ)} + R−1 {H2 (1 − c2 ) + N (c2 , H2 ; θ)} .
At an interior optimum (i.e. optimal investment and crime satisfy 0 < I, c1 , I + c1 , c2 < 1):
FI

= −H1 + s + R−1 [(1 − c2 ) + NH (c2 , H2 ; θ)] hI (I, H1 ; A) = 0

Fc1

= −H1 + Nc (c1 , H1 ; θ) = 0

Fc2

= R−1 [−H2 + Nc (c2 , H2 ; θ)] = 0.

Assuming s < H1 combined with FI = 0 implies that 1 − c2 + NH2 > 0 at an optimum. Given
NH ≥ 0, this is necessary for optimal c2 ∈ (0, 1) as required for an interior solution. We use the fact
that 1 − c2 + NH2 > 0 at an interior optimum repeatedly throughout this appendix without further
reference.
Second order conditions
for a maximum

 require a negative definite hessian matrix of second derivaFII FIc1 FIc2
tives for F , H =  FIc1 Fc1 c1 Fc1 c2 , where FIc1 = Fc1 c2 = 0 and
FIc2 Fc1 c2 Fc2 c2
FII

£
¤
= R−1 (1 − c2 + NH2 ) hII + NH2 H2 h2I < 0

Fc1 c1

= Nc1 c1 < 0

Fc2 c2

= R−1 Nc2 c2 < 0

FIc2

= R−1 hI (NH2 c2 − 1) .

Condition 1 implies that FIc2 ≤ 0; otherwise, FIc2 > 0 when Condition 1 does not hold.
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Result 1: Effects of s
Using Cramer’s rule, observe that

∂I
∂s

=

−Fc1 c1 Fc2 c2
|H|

at an optimum (SOC for a maximum). We obtain
then

∂c2
∂s

∂c2
∂s

≤ 0; otherwise,

> 0, since FIs = 1, Fc1 s = Fc2 s = 0, and |H| < 0
∂c1
∂s

= 0 and

∂c2
∂s

=

Fc1 c1 FIc2
.
|H|

If Condition 1 holds,

> 0.

Result 2: Effects of A
Notice Fc1 A = 0,
FIA = R−1 hIA (1 − c2 + NH2 ) + R−1 hI hA NH2 H2
Fc2 A = R−1 hA (Nc2 H2 − 1) .
The first term in FIA is greater than zero at an optimum; however, the second term is generally
negative. Yet, for hI < ∞ and hA < ∞, there exists some small ε > 0 for which FIA > 0 if NHH > −ε
by continuity. Fc2 A ≤ 0 if condition 1 holds; otherwise, it is strictly greater than zero.
−Fc1 c1 (FIA Fc2 c2 −Fc2 A FIc2 )
∂I
∂I
. Thus, ∂A
> 0 if NHH
∂A =
|H|
−Fc1 c1 (FII Fc2 A −FIc2 FIA )
2
. If Condition 1 holds, then ∂c
∂A ≤ 0;
|H|

Applying Cramer’s rule, we obtain
also obtain
∂c2
∂A

∂c1
∂s

∂c2
∂A

= 0 and

=

> −ε. We
otherwise,

> 0.

Result 3: Effects of H1
Notice
= −1 + R−1 [hIH1 (1 − c2 + NH2 ) + hI NH2 H2 (1 + hH1 )]

FIH1
Fc1 H1

= NH1 c1 − 1

Fc2 H1

= R−1 (1 + hH1 ) (Nc2 H2 − 1) .

While Fc1 H1 ≤ 0 and Fc2 H1 ≤ 0 if Condition 1 holds (otherwise, both are positive), it is not possible
to generally sign FIH1 . As such, it is not possible to sign
show that

∂c1
∂H1

=

2 )
−Fc1 H1 (FII Fc2 c2 −FIc
2

1 holds; otherwise,

|H|

∂c1
∂H1

∂I
∂H1

and

∂c2
∂H2 .

Using Cramer’s rule, one can

2 > 0 at a maximum,
. Since FII Fc2 c2 − FIc
2

> 0.

Result 4: Effects of θ
Notice
FIθ = R−1 hI NθH2
Fc1 θ = Nc1 θ > 0
Fc2 θ = R−1 Nc2 θ > 0.
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∂c1
∂H1

≤ 0 if Condition

2 )
−Fc1 θ (FII Fc2 c2 −FIc
∂c1
2 > 0 at a maximum.
2
=
> 0, since FII Fc2 c2 − FIc
∂θ
|H|
2
−Fc1 c1 (FIθ Fc2 c2 −FIc2 Fc2 θ )
−Fc1 c1 (FII Fc2 θ −FIθ FIc2 )
∂c2
Furthermore, ∂I
=
=
and
.
If
Condition 1 holds and
∂θ
∂θ
|H|
|H|
∂c2
∂I
NHθ ≤ 0, then ∂I
∂θ ≤ 0 and ∂θ > 0. If Condition 1 does not hold and NHθ > 0, then ∂θ > 0 and
∂c2
∂θ > 0.

Cramer’s rule implies that

Case 2: Non-Working Adolescents
We now consider the problem when optimal investment and first period crime satisfy I + c1 = 1.
Imposing c1 = 1 − I, the individual objective function to be maximized with respect to I and c2 is:
G(I, c2 ; A, H1 , θ, s) ≡ {sI + N (1 − I, H1 ; θ)} + R−1 {H2 (1 − c2 ) + N (c2 , H2 ; θ)} .
At an interior optimum (i.e. optimal investment and crime satisfy 0 < I, c2 < 1):
GI
Gc2

= s − Nc (1 − I, H1 ; θ) + R−1 [(1 − c2 ) + NH (c2 , H2 ; θ)] hI (I, H1 ; A) = 0
= R−1 [−H2 + Nc (c2 , H2 ; θ)] = 0.

For optimal c2 ∈ (0, 1), it must be the case that 1−c2 +NH2 > 0. This implies that s < Nc (1−I, H1 , θ)
at an optimum, since GI = 0. We use the fact that 1 − c2 + NH2 > 0 (at an optimum) repeatedly
below.

µ

Second order conditions for a maximum require negative definite H̃ =

GII
GIc2

GIc2
Gc2 c2

¶
with

|H̃| > 0, where
GII
Gc2 c2
GIc2

£
¤
= Nc1 c1 + R−1 (1 − c2 + NH2 ) hII + NH2 H2 h2I < 0
= R−1 Nc2 c2 < 0
= R−1 hI (NH2 c2 − 1) .

Condition 1 implies that GIc2 ≤ 0; otherwise, GIc2 > 0.
We derive comparative statics results for I and c2 below. Because c1 = 1 − I,

∂c1
∂x

∂I
= − ∂x
for any

variable x.
Result 1: Effects of s
Clearly, GIs = 1 and Gc2 s = 0, so Cramer’s rule implies that
Condition 1 holds, then

∂c2
∂s

≤ 0; otherwise,

∂c2
∂s

∂I
∂s

=

−Gc2 c2
|H̃|

> 0.

Result 2: Effects of A
Notice
GIA = R−1 hIA (1 − c2 + NH2 ) + R−1 hI hA NH2 H2
Gc2 A = R−1 hA (Nc2 H2 − 1) .
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> 0 and

∂c2
∂s

=

GIc2
.
|H̃|

If

As was the case above, for hI < ∞ and hA < ∞, there exists some small ε > 0 for which GIA > 0 if
NHH > −ε by continuity. Gc2 A ≤ 0 if condition 1 holds; otherwise, Gc2 A > 0.
Applying Cramer’s rule, we obtain
also obtain

∂c2
∂A

=

−(GII Gc2 A −GIc2 GIA )
.
|H̃|

−(GIA Gc2 c2 −Gc2 A GIc2 )
∂I
. Thus, ∂A
> 0 if NHH > −ε.
|H̃|
∂c2
2
Condition 1 holds, then ∂c
∂A ≤ 0; otherwise, ∂A > 0.

∂I
∂A

If

=

We

Result 3: Effects of H1
Notice
GIH1
Gc2 H1

= −Nc1 H1 + R−1 [hIH1 (1 − c2 + NH2 ) + hI NH2 H2 (1 + hH1 )]
= R−1 (1 + hH1 ) (Nc2 H2 − 1) .

While Gc2 H1 ≤ 0 if Condition 1 holds (otherwise, it is positive), it is not possible to generally sign
GIH1 . If NH = 0, then GIc2 < 0, GIH1 > 0, and Gc2 H1 < 0. In this case, applying Cramer’s rule
yields

∂I
∂H1

> 0 and

∂c2
∂H2

< 0.

Result 4: Effects of θ
Notice
GIθ = −Nc1 θ + R−1 hI NθH2
Gc2 θ = R−1 Nc2 θ > 0.
Clearly, GIθ < 0 if NHθ ≤ 0; otherwise, it cannot generally be signed. If Condition 1 holds and
NHθ ≤ 0, then applying Cramer’s rule yields

∂I
∂θ

≤ 0 and
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∂c2
∂θ

> 0.
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Figure 1: Regression-Adjusted Probability of Incarceration by Education (Men Ages 20-60)
(a) Whites
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Table 2: Effects of Selected Early Childhood Programs on Educational Attainment and Adult Crime
Program

Abecedarian
Project

Chicago Child
Parent Center

Program Description

Program Population

Methodology

Education Effects

Crime Effects

full-time full-year pre- developmentally at-risk
school from infancy
children, Chapel Hill,
Random Assign.
to kindergarten
NC

increased high school
graduation rate by 0.03
(0.70 vs. 0.67) and
no sig. effects by age 21
enrollment in 4-yr
*
college by 0.22 (0.36 vs.
0.14)

half-day preschool
(school year) ages 3
and 4

Matched Sample

increased high school
completion rate by 0.09
(0.57 vs. 0.48) for
females and 0.14* (0.43
vs. 0.29) for males

by age 18, reduced
fraction arrested by 0.08*
(0.17 vs. 0.25)

Random Assign.

increased high school
graduation rates by 0.52*
(0.84 vs. 0.32) for
females and reduced
grad. rates by 0.04 (0.50
vs. 0.54) for males

by age 40, reduced
fraction arrested 5 or more
times by 0.10* (0.24 vs.
0.34) for females and
0.24* (0.45 vs. 0.69) for
males

Random Assign.

no sig. effect on high
school dropout (approx.
10% dropout rate)

no sig. effects on arrests
by age 18

low-income minority
children, Chicago, IL

High/Scope Perry
Preschool

half-day preschool
(school year) ages 3
and 4, bi-weekly
home visits

low-income black
children at risk of
school failure,
Ypislanti, MI

Infant Health &
Development
Program (IHDP)

weekly/bi-weekly
home visits from 0-36
low birth-weight premonths, full-time fullterm infants, 8 sites
year pre-school 12-36
months

Notes: Effects for Abecedarian Project taken from Campbell, et al. (2002) and Clarke and Campbell (1998). Effects for Chicago Child Parent Center taken from Reynolds,
et al. (2001). Effects for Perry Preschool taken from Schweinhart, et al. (2005). Effects for IHDP taken from McCormick, et al. (2006). *denotes difference is statistically
significant at 0.05 level.

Table 3: Social Benefits of Increasing High School Completion Rates by 1 Percent

Violent Crimes
Murder
Rape
Robbery
Assault
Property Crimes
Burglary
Larceny/Theft
Motor Vehicle Theft
Arson
Total

Total Cost
per crime

Est. Change
in Arrests

Est. Change
in Crimes

Social
Benefit

4,506,253
132,938
13,984
14,776

-373
347
134
-7,798

-373
1,559
918
-37,135

$1,683,083,243
-$207,270,899
-$12,839,495
$548,690,721

1,471
295
1,855
58,171

-653
-1,983
-1,355
-69

-9,467
-35,105
-14,238
-469

$13,920,409
$10,347,853
$26,414,558
$27,302,131

-11,750

-94,310

$2,089,648,519

Notes: These costs reflect incarceration and victim costs. Victim costs are taken from Miller, et
al. (1996). Incarceration costs per crime equal the incarceration cost per inmate multiplied by the
incarceration rate for that crime (approximately $25,000). Incarceration rates by offense type are
calculated as the total number of individuals in jail or prison (from U.S. Department of Justice, 1994)
divided by the total number of offenses that year (where the number of offenses are adjusted for nonreporting to the police). Incarceration costs per inmate are taken from U.S. Department of Justice
(1999). All dollar figures are translated into 2008 dollars using the CPI-U. Source: Lochner and
Moretti (2004).

